Thursday, June 30, 2011

The Missing Man in 2D

Gosh - for a long time, I've wanted a hard copy of the Missing Man for reading and reference offline. After some research, I finally settled on a primitive PDF format as it allows the embedded links to remain active. It's not perfect but it works. The least I can do is share it with anyone who wants a copy. (I plan to update Volume 4 some point in the future) 

The Missing Man blog posts are divided into 5 separate volumes. They are available for download (free) through Google docs.

Volume 1 - Introduction, Overview, Index, Bibliography

Volume 2 - November 12, 2003 - May 13, 2008

Volume 3 - May 25, 2008 - March 28, 2010

Volume 4 - March 31, 2010 - June 13, 2011

Volume 5 - Appendix

Download Directions

To download or print each volume, after following the link, just click on 'File' in the upper left hand corner. See insert below.

Saturday, June 25, 2011

Asymmetric Threat Division - opposition

Review of Joint Forces Intelligence Command Response to 9/11 Commission PDF
Deputy Inspector General for Intelligence
United States Department of Defense
September 23, 2008
Declassified March 5, 2010
From the Federation of American Scientists

(U) JFIC's Asymmetric Threat Division (DO5)

(U) In 1999, the [Joint Forces Intelligence Command]created the Asymmetric Threat Division (DO5) to take a non-traditional approach to analysis. The Director of Operations recruited JFIC personnel from the command based upon their counterintelligence and counterterrorism expertise. The DO5 provided current intelligence briefings and produced the Worldwide Terrorist Threat Summary in support of the USJFCOM Intelligence staff. The DO5 also provided support to the Joint Task Force-Civil Support (JTF-CS). The JTF-CS assisted civil authorities with disaster assistance. The DO5 supported the JTF-CS exercises by establishing fictional terrorist organizations that would mimic real world terrorist groups.
Reviewing Jeffrey Kaye and Jason Leopold's two recent articles over at Truth Out and the related documents. Thinking a bit out loud here and feeling my way around it all.

Anyway, what I am trying to understand is this: why were commanding officers so opposed to the Asymmetric Threat Division's intelligence analysis regarding al Qaeda? Just what the heck was going on over there - was it a Navy thing or was there more to it than that?

Principals

Pieced together from various sources, a very rough list of 'principals' from the 2000-2001 time period. Keep in mind there's some overlap with people coming and going, promotions, etc. Some of the titles might be wrong (my error) and there's a bunch of unknowns. At least it's a starting point.

Admiral Harold W. Gehman, Jr. served as Commander In Chief U.S. Joint Forces Command from September 1997 until his retirement September 2000. His replacement was General Kernan.

Lieutenant General Thomas N. Burnette, Jr. served as Deputy Commander In Chief U.S. Joint Forces Command from July 1999 until his retirement September 2000. His replacement was Vice Admiral Mayer.
  • General William F. Kernan, US Army - Commander in Chief, US Joint Forces Command
  • Vice Admiral Martin J. Mayer, USN - Deputy Commander in Chief, US JFCOM
  • Major General Jack R. Holbein Jr., USAF - Chief of Staff, US JFCOM
  • Colonel Daniel P. Bolger, US Army - Director, Strategy and Analysis, US JFCOM
  • [unknown] - Director of Operations, US JFCOM
  • [unknown] - Deputy Director of Operations, US JFCOM
  • Vice Admiral Robert B. Murrett, USN - Director for Intelligence, US JFCOM
  • [unknown] - Deputy Director for Intelligence, US JFCOM
  • [unknown] - Director for Intelligence Operations, US JFCOM
  • [unknown] - Deputy Director for Intelligence Operations, US JFCOM
  • Captain Janice M. Dundas, USN - Commander in Chief, Joint Forces Intelligence Command
  • [unknown] - Deputy Commander in Chief,  JFIC
  • [unknown] - Director of Operations, JFIC
  • [unknown] - Deputy Director of Operations, JFIC
  • Major Oliver Wright III, US Army - Division Head, Asymmetric Threat Division, JFIC
  • John Rodriguez, NCIS - Deputy Division Head, Asymmetric Threat Division, JFIC
  • Captain Stephen F. Santez Jr., USN - [title unknown], Asymmetric Threat Division, JFIC
  • Captain Kirk von Ackermann, USAF - Deputy, Asymmetric Threat Division, JFIC
  • [unknown] - Operations Officer, Asymmetric Threat Division, JFIC
  • [unknown] - Counterintelligence Security Officer, US JFCOM
  • Major General Bruce M. Lawlor, US Army - Commander, Joint Task Force - Civil Support 
  • [unknown] - Deputy Commander, JTF-CS
  • [unknown] - Chief of Staff, JTF-CS
Just from a history standpoint, 2000 - 2001 is a fascinating period for the US military and in particular, Joint Forces Command: it's all about transformation. Commander in Chief (CINC), General William F. Kernan, created a new directorate tasking a team, Mayer, Holbein and Bolger, to manage transformation strategy for JFCOM.
The CINC's charter to this team was simple: infuse joint forces with new ideas, and change the way JFCOM will fight. [...]

Rigorous simulation and gaming must be pursued in response to new or emerging technologies and concepts. [1]
Infuse joint forces with new ideas and rigorous simulations....only, not so much.

Oddly enough, Kernan was worried about procuring laser-guided missiles to replenish what was lost during Kosovo, essentially bringing missiles to a knife fight. Meanwhile, a new subordinate organization - the Joint Task Force-Civil Support - was tasked to "serve as the U.S. Joint Forces Command lead for WMD events in the United States"[2]. To prepare, JTF-CS was conducting quarterly training exercises (simulations) based on chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high yield explosives incidents. The Navy - who held the purse strings - wasn't so hot about sponsoring Joint Forces Command. [3]

From Jeffrey Kaye's source materials, IRON MAN on page 2 of his Formal Complaint to DoD Inspector General [4] writes:
[The Asymmetric Threat Division] DO5 began preparing a wide range of original analysis on asymmetric warfare, especially terrorism, from mid-1998 until mid-2001. This analysis included: [...]

(U) Reports on the most likely targets for domestic and international terrorists both within the US and abroad, as well as adjunct targets during a traditional war. The most sensitive of these reports were those identifying targets within the US, developing scenarios, analysis of commonalities for use in planning responses and recommendations for preventative action. This US tasking was given by JTF-CS.
JTF-CS was clearly asking DO5 to help prepare realistic scenarios for its training exercises which meshes with what Megan von Ackermann has written [5] about her husband, that Captain Kirk von Ackermann was involved with designing 'readiness exercises'. In a statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Major General Bruce M. Lawlor, the first Commander of Joint Task Force - Civil Support (JTF-CS) provided some details about JTF-CS. [6]
In addition to planning for real world events, JTF-CS conducts quarterly training exercises that focus on planning and deployment for specific types of CBRNE incidents. To date we have conducted such exercises in each of the 5 areas with which we are concerned: chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and high yield explosive events. We have learned to create a base plan for the most dangerous event and prepare branches and sequels for other possible incidents. By doing so, we have reduced our response planning time considerably.
Planning for real world events...against real adversaries, like Al Qaeda. Lawlor casually mentions in his statement that one such exercise was quietly conducted live during the Presidential inauguration of George W. Bush.

The work of the Asymmetric Threat Division - and Captain Kirk von Ackermann - starts coming into focus and becomes much more tangible. These guys aren't sitting around playing video games, they're playing for real. The intelligence is real. The enemy is real. The targets - real. The scenarios - real. The maps - real. The threat - real.

So, why were they getting shut down orders? Who didn't want them trained and ready to fight the bad guys?

Again, from Jeffrey Kaye's source materials, IRON MAN states on page 5 of his Formal Complaint to DoD Inspector General [7]:
[U] [redacted] the last JFIC commanding officer under which I served adamantly opposed JFIC conducting any original analysis of al-Qa'ida, and directed work be stopped in late 2000 - early 2001, and enforced that order upon my departure.
Review of Joint Forces Intelligence Command Response to 9/11 Commission, Appendix C - a March 25, 2002 letter attached to the FOIA response signed by Major John A. Robinson, USAF, [8] clearly identifies Captain Janice M. Dundas, US Navy, as Commander of the JFIC. Back in March 2000, Dundas signed Captain Kirk von Ackermann's letter of appreciation.

In the section marked, JFIC Response to Congress [9], page 14, the Inspector General states:
(U) The JFIC's Commanding Officer established a command atmosphere which highlighted intelligence oversight and mission focus. The DO5 Operations Officer stated that the JFIC was very cautious over the support that was provided to the JTF-CS based on intelligence oversight guidelines. The Deputy Director of Intelligence stated that JFIC Commanding Officer would repeatedly ask for written certification to justify any tasking to any department or division. He further stated that DO5 had no theater specific mission. The subsequent Deputy Director of Intelligence directed him to stop tracking Usama Bin Laden. The Commanding Officer stated that the tracking of Usama Bin Laden did not fall in JFIC's mission. The Commanding Officer also stated that a couple of folks doing analysis of Afghanistan terrorist training camps was perceived as excess capability when it's not your AOR [Area of Operations] and that the issues were not in JFIC's swim lane.
Someone needs to ask Dundas what she was afraid of - whose toesies were getting stepped on. Was it coming from above her? Did she personally object to Major General Bruce M. Lawlor, Commander of JTF-CS? Petty, yes, but not unheard of.

Vice Admiral Martin J. Mayer, also Navy, was the Deputy Commander in Chief. Prior to serving as DCINC, Mayer was Director for Strategy Requirements and Integration at JFCOM and part of Kernan's 'team' to manage transformation strategy for JFCOM.

IRON MAN notes in his Formal Complaint that "...senior JFCOM staff including the DCINC and J3" were present at the first Asymmetric Threat Division briefing titled, "The WMD Threat to the US."[10] After the briefing, it had been noted that the national military terrorism exercise committment for FY01 involved a cruise ship.

A few months later, Mayer was nominated for appointment to Vice Admiral and Deputy Commander of US Joint Forces on September 15, 2000. Within a month, on October 12, 2000, the USS Cole was the victim of a suicide bombing in Yemen. 17 sailors died that day. By December, CNN was reporting that Al Qaeda was responsible. [11]

In the Afterword to the book Touching History: The Untold Story of the Drama That Unfolded in the Skies Over America on 9/11, Major General (retired) Larry Arnold 1st Air Force and the Continental US North American Air Defense Command Region wrote:
Just two weeks before September 11, 2001, I had met with Vice Admiral Martin Mayer, the deputy commander in chief of Joint Forces Command located in Norfolk, Virginia. He had informed me that he intended to kill all funding for a plan my command had been working on for two years, that would defend against a cruise missile attack by terrorists. While I convinced Admiral Mayer to continue his funding support, he told me in front of my chief of staff, Colonel Alan Scott; Navy Captain David Stewart, the lead on the project; and my executive officer, Lt. Col. Kelley Duckett, that our concern about Osama bin Laden as a possible threat to America was unfounded and that, to repeat, ‘If everyone would just turn off CNN, there wouldn’t be a threat from Osama bin Laden.’ [12]
Mayer's myopic thinking was far from unique. His Commander in Chief, General Kernan, was interviewed for an article shortly after the Cole bombing [13]:
The way the United States deploys its ships and troops overseas, as well as how they are based at home, will be forever changed because of the attack on the destroyer Cole, according to the man responsible for providing forces to America's combat commanders. [...]

The Cole, a $1 billion Arleigh Burke-class destroyer, was attacked Oct. 12 while it refueled in the southern Arabian port of Aden, Yemen. Seventeen sailors from the Norfolk-based ship died and 42 others were injured.

"I don't think anybody could have predicted somebody would come floating up there on a commercially made skiff that had an embedded shape charge in it, come right up against the side of a ship and blow a 40-by-40-foot hole in it," [Kernan] said. "It's incredible they were able to achieve it."
It's not that big of a jump in the imagination from commercial skiff to commercial jet. Within a year, hijackers on a suicide mission would hit the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.

It's like the commanders just couldn't face up to a very real war. They couldn't - or wouldn't - see the elephant in the room - asymmetric threats from groups like Al Qaeda.

It's all so.....disappointing.

References

New Documents Claim Intelligence on Bin Laden, al-Qaeda Targets Withheld From Congress' 9/11 Probe
By Jeffrey Kaye and Jason Leopold, Truthout, June 13, 2011

Attachment - Unclassified FOIA Response PDF - includes:
FOIA response
April 8, 2011
Formal Complaint to DoD Inspector General
re: JFIC and Congressional Inquiry
May 8, 2006

Report: Intelligence Unit Told Before 9/11 to Stop Tracking Bin Laden
By Jeffrey Kaye, Truthout, May 23, 2011

Review of Joint Forces Intelligence Command Response to 9/11 Commission PDF
Deputy Inspector General for Intelligence
United States Department of Defense
September 23, 2008
Declassified March 5, 2010
From the Federation of American Scientists

[1] A Study of Joint Transformation at United States Joint Forces Command
By Colonel Lorraine E. Tyacke, United States Army, April 9, 2002

[2] Management of National Guard, Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Teams
Office of the Inspector General, Department of Defense
Audit Report No. D-2001-043
See: Coordination With Other Organizations
January 31, 2001

[3] Tyacke, page 8

[4] Attachment - Unclassified FOIA Response PDF - includes:
FOIA response
April 8, 2011
Formal Complaint to DoD Inspector General
re: JFIC and Congressional Inquiry
May 8, 2006

[5] Getting to Iraq part two: Counter Terrorism
By Megan von Ackermann, Missing in Iraq, March 24, 2006

[6] Statement of Major General Bruce M. Lawlor PDF
US Army, Commander, Joint Task Force-Civil Support,
US Joint Forces Command
Before the Senate Armed Services Committee on Status
Update of JTF-CS
May 1, 2001

[7] Unclassified FOIA Response, page 5

[8] Review of Joint Forces Intelligence Command Response to 9/11 Commission
Deputy Inspector General for Intelligence
United States Department of Defense
September 23, 2008
Declassified March 5, 2010

[9] Ibid, page 14

[10]Unclassified FOIA Response, page 3

[11] USS Cole plot began after embassy attacks, investigator says
David Ensor, Chris Plante and Peter Bergen, CNN, December 20, 2000

[12] Touching History: The Untold Story of the Drama That Unfolded in the Skies Over America on 9/11, By Lynn Spencer, Free Press, June 3, 2008
Afterword, page 285-291, by Major General (retired) Larry Arnold 1st Air Force and the Continental US North American Air Defense Command Region at Tyndall Air Force base near Panama City, FL.

[13] Cole Alters Military's Perception of Security; Joint Forces Chief Assesses Challenges at Overseas Posts, By Jack Dorsey, The Virginian-Pilot (archive $) January 28, 2001

Additional Reading

Military Support of Civil Authorities—
A New Focus for a New Millennium
Major General Bruce M. Lawlor
, Commander, 
Joint Task Force–Civil Support
October 2000 (Updated September 2001)

Report of the Joint Inquiry into the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001 PDF - By the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (declassified version)
S. REPT. NO. 107- 351 and H. REPT. NO. 107-792
December 20, 2002

9-11 Commission Report
The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
July 22, 2004

9/11 Commission - Appendix C - Hearings - witnesses, etc

Notes

Admiral Harold W. Gehman, Jr. served as Commander In Chief U.S. Joint Forces Command from September 1997 until his retirement September 2000

Vice Admiral Robert B. Murrett, USN served as the director for Intelligence, US Joint Forces Command, from August 10, 2000 through January 25, 2002

Monday, June 13, 2011

Truthout - Intelligence Withheld From Congress

PS. I just want to take a moment to publicly thank all of the contractors, as well as the military, intelligence, and private military personnel who have graciously shared their knowledge and experience with me over the years. Their information has helped me to better understand the incredibly complex world that men (and women) like Kirk von Ackermann work in. 

While working for Ultra Services of Istanbul Turkey, an American contractor and former intelligence officer, Kirk von Ackermann, disappeared on an isolated road in Iraq on October 9, 2003. He remains the longest missing American in Iraq today.

This blog is loaded with over 7 years of research about the incident as well as the murder of his colleague, Ryan Manelick, who died in December 2003. My own personal belief is that von Ackermann was killed because he was mistaken for John Dawkins who was for all intents and purposes part owner of Ultra Services.

At one point, I discussed the case with one of Kirk von Ackermann's former colleagues and shared my thoughts but for some reason, the scenario I outlined seemed like too much of a stretch. Which is a kind of twisted irony - even in death - Kirk von Ackermann just remains too far outside the socially acceptable, just like the scenarios he once imagined as an intelligence officer.

Truthout

Jeffrey Kaye continues lifting the veil on 9-11 intelligence failures with a new article at Truthout. The end of the article reviews some of what is known in public about Kirk von Ackermann.

I should probably just go on record and reveal that I first learned of the Asymmetric Threat Division - by name - back in 2005. I was under the impression the name of the group was classified and thus never revealed it. I was also once told that Kirk von Ackermann was possibly one of the finest intelligence officers to work for the DoD in the last century. He was said to have had an incredible talent for connecting seemingly unrelated details. I was told his work saved lives - literally.

Insert of the last page of documents from an Unclassified FOIA Response included with the article at Truthout, EXCLUSIVE: New Documents Claim Intelligence on Bin Laden, al-Qaeda Targets Withheld From Congress' 9/11 Probe by Jeffrey Kaye and Jason Leopold, June 13, 2011.
The Unclassified FOIA Response attached to the Truthout article is an absolute must read. The FOIA Response was the result of a 2006 complaint to the DoD Inspector General filed by a former intelligence officer known only as IRONMAN.
EXCLUSIVE: New Documents Claim Intelligence on Bin Laden, al-Qaeda Targets Withheld From Congress' 9/11 Probe
By Jeffrey Kaye and Jason Leopold, Truthout, June 13, 2011
Attachment - Unclassified FOIA Response 
The last page of the FOIA Response - which quotes IRONMAN - holds particular interest for this blog.
(U) [unclassified] My motivation for this complaint is multi-faceted. I do believe that knowledge of the work done by DO5 would add to DoD's understanding of its role in the events leading up to 9/11 and how to avoid future attacks. For this reason, and other more personal reasons, I believe that DO5's analysis, especially the target analysis, should be reviewed and, if possible, declassified. I have been falsely accused of revealing classified information on DO5's work, when I am certain that that information is not and has not been classified since 9/11, and I do want to see myself cleared of that false accusation. In addition, I and the deputy of that team, [redacted] especially carried the burden of knowledge of how close DoD came to bin Laden and perhaps being able to reduce the number of lives lost on 9/11. I do not want that burden any longer. [redacted] [redacted] and I discussed this issue the last time we spoke. He remains the longest missing man in Iraq in this war, and I want, one day, to be able to explain to his children what their father foresaw.
The former deputy of the Asymmetric Threat Division and the longest missing man in Iraq is Kirk von Ackermann. The complicated and contentious history of the company he worked for in Iraq, Ultra Services, was featured in a 2006 article at ePluribus Media.
One Missing, One Dead: An Iraq Contractor in the Fog of War
By Susie Dow, ePluribus Media, May 12, 2006
The US Army CID did the best investigation they could with the information available to them. But they were horribly lead astray by working with the assumption that Kirk von Ackermann disappeared from where his vehicle was found. Von Ackermann's military experience - especially as detailed in the Unclassified FOIA Response - makes clear the events of that day were well outside his norm of behavior.

NSA audio recordings

On October 8, 2003, the day before he disappeared, Kirk von Ackermann called his wife in the United States from Iraq. He left a short message on their home answering machine.

The following day, October 9, just minutes before he 'disappeared', von Ackermann using his satellite phone reportedly called the cell phone of an Iraqi employee and requested help with a bad tire. Several minutes later, a passing patrol reported an abandoned vehicle just several miles down the road from a manned checkpoint. The Iraqi employee arrived approximately 45 minutes later.

It is my belief that an impostor placed that satellite call to the Iraqi employee - who due to limited language skills with English would be unable to tell the difference between two English speaking men's voices.

NSA has audio files of satellite phone calls originating in Iraq during this time period and is in a position to facilitate an analysis to see if in fact the male who placed the call to the Iraqi employee was Kirk von Ackermann. It defies any and all logic that Kirk von Ackermann deliberately drove alone with a bad tire - and without a translator - on a journey of over 165 miles through Iraq, with 7 of those miles on an isolated ridge he had previously identified as the most dangerous part of the journey between Tikrit and Kirkuk.

Perhaps investigators will finally get around to treating the disappearance of Kirk von Ackermann as the unsolved murder that it is.

Additional Reading

DoD Whistleblower: Documents Show Intel Withheld from 9/11 Congressional Investigators - author discussion and commentary of the Truthout article
By Jeff Kaye, FireDogLake, June 13, 2011

By Jeffrey Kaye, Truthout, May 23, 2011

DoD Inspector General: Intel Agency Ordered to Stop Pre-9/11 Tracking of Bin Laden - author discussion and commentary of the Truthout article
By Jeff Kaye, FireDogLake, May 24, 2011

Deputy Inspector General for Intelligence
Department of Defense
September 23, 2008

Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities before and after the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001
Report of the joint inquiry motivated IRON MAN's formal complaint, that JFIC withheld intelligence from congress
S. Rept. 107-351 and H. Rept. 107-792
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
U.S. Government Printing Office
December 2002

By Susie Dow, Missing Man, May 6, 2011

By Susie Dow, Missing Man, October 8, 2006

And because no one clicks on links anymore....

By Megan von Ackermann, Missing in Iraq, March 24, 2006
After Y2K, Kirk became more and more consumed by the counter-terrorism world. He was read into higher and higher clearances, learned more and more about the largest threats to the US and her allies. Specifically he became deeply aware of Osama Bin Ladin and his organization.

Kirk was involved with designing readiness excercises - scenarios to be used by various units as they tested their skills. He proposed that a small boat filled with explosives be used as a weapon against a large warship - and was told it was an unrealistic idea. This was, of course, well prior to the USS Cole attack.

He also, along with his team, not only suggested that a commercial jet could be used as a terrorist weapon, but predicted the most likely targets that would be chosen. Again, he was ignored, and sometimes laughed at.
Dual Lives
By Megan von Ackermann, Missing in Iraq, September 5, 2006
One afternoon we were driving up the highway outside of Langley. I was reading a magazine - the Smithsonian I think - and I was chatting to Kirk about an article discussing the greatest achievement of modern medicine: the successful campaign against smallpox. Wasn't it amazing, I said, the way the WHO had managed it, wasn't it wonderful that the world was safe now from a disease that had been a deadly threat for thousands of years. Very quietly, his hands stiff on the wheel, he said 'it's not gone.'

Just that. But I knew - I knew that not only did he know that more than one country had kept live samples of the virus, he knew intimately the infection rate, the symptoms, the horrific scarring that those lucky enough to survive would suffer. He knew how it could be weaponized, had thought about delivery systems, had worked through countless scenarios in which various populations were targeted and infected.

And gradually I realized that he was living like that constantly. Everywhere we went, there was part of him looking around and evaluating targets, thinking about blast zones, considering mortality rates, political value, public reaction.
Now tell me that same man, Kirk von Ackermann, chose to deliberately drive alone in an SUV with a bad tire over 165 miles without a translator most of it through Saddam Hussein's tribal area. Didn't happen.....