Remains of Al Taie Recovered

From Marcie Hascall Clark of The Defense Base Act Compensation Blog comes two news stories about service members missing in Iraq - Staff Sgt. Ahmed al-Taie and Major Troy Gilbert.

Army IDs remains of last missing soldier in Iraq
By Lara Jakes, Associated Press, WRAL, February 26, 2012

The U.S military announced Sunday that it has recovered the remains of the last American service member who was unaccounted for in Iraq, an Army interpreter seized by gunmen after sneaking off base to visit his Iraqi wife in Baghdad during the height of the insurgency.

The remains of Staff Sgt. Ahmed al-Taie, who was 41 when militiamen seized him on Oct. 23, 2006, were positively identified at the military's mortuary in Dover, Del., the Army said in a statement released Sunday. Army officials said they had no further details about the circumstances surrounding his death or the discovery of his remains.

More details in the article including the information that the remains were received at Dover on February 22. My sincere condolences to al-Taie's family and friends.

In a television interview, family of Major Troy Gilbert reveal the Pentagon will resume searching for his remains. Gilbert was killed when his jet crashed in 2006. His body was taken by insurgents before it could be recovered by US personnel.

Pentagon will reopen search for missing airman in Iraq
By Jim Douglas, WFAA, February 24, 2012

The family of a Texas pilot killed in Iraq says their prayers have been answered Friday.

They've received formal assurance that the Pentagon has reconsidered the case of Major Troy Gilbert and will reopen the search for his remains.

Related

Americans Missing in Iraq as of February 26, 2012

Rescuing Hostages

An article on how rescue missions have been shaped by the last decade of experience in Iraq. Includes quotes from Roy Hallums who was held for almost a year before being rescued. From what I can tell, only a few publications seem to have picked up the article so far. I hope it gets more attention.

War experience aids missions to save hostages
By Jason Straziuso, Associated Press, February 7, 2012

Hills - aerial photo

Photo taken from a Black Hawk helicopter of the hills that form the ridge line between Tikrit and Kirkuk. Kirk von Ackermann's vehicle was found abandoned in this isolated area and once described as the most dangerous part of the journey from Tikrit to Kirkuk.

From the photo, it looks like the road is unpaved.

Photo credit Faysal Akbik
Description: This series of low hills or mountains stood out as a landmark in a Tikrit to Kirkuk Black Hawk flight.

Left Behind in Iraq

Article on missing military personnel that contains a brief mention of Kirk von Ackermann.

Missing in action: Service members left behind
By Austin Wright, Politico, February 8, 2012

With U.S. combat troops out of Iraq and a time frame for a pullout set in Afghanistan, an ominous question looms: Who will we have left behind?

In Iraq, at least one U.S. service member is currently listed as missing, along with three defense contractors. [...]

More than five years later, Altaie’s case remains unsolved and has been turned over to the missing personnel office, along with those of three missing defense contractors: Kirk Von Ackermann, lost since 2003; Timothy Bell, lost since 2004; and Adnan al-Hilawi, lost since 2007.

Investigators spent the past two months reviewing files and crafting plans for how to proceed on each case. “It’s a lot of reading through records of various things that have happened in the past and putting that all together,” said the official at the missing personnel office. “It’s like detective work.”

And of course, there's still others missing. There's a link to the list just up there under the header for this blog.

The DPMO website cites 4 men as missing - see below. And yet, other contractors are known to still be missing. My only guess as to why others were omitted from the DPMO list is they weren't working under contract for the Department of Defense.

Operation Iraqi Freedom, 2003-2010

• Staff Sgt. Ahmed K. Altaie, U.S. Army, was lost on Oct. 23, 2006 while serving in Iraq as a translator for the U.S. military
• Mr. Kirk Von Ackermann, DoD contractor, was lost on Oct. 9, 2003, while working in Forward Operating Base Pacesetter, Iraq
• Mr. Timothy E. Bell, DoD contractor, was lost on April 9, 2004, while working in Baghdad, Iraq
• Mr. Adnan al-Hilawi, DoD contractor, was lost on March 3, 2007, while working in Baghdad, Iraq

Body of Alan McMenemy delivered to embassy

Body of Iraq hostage Alan McMenemy handed over to Baghdad embassy
By Conal Urquhart, Guardian, January 20, 2012

The body of a Briton, who was taken hostage in Iraq and later killed, has been handed over to the British embassy in Baghdad, it was announced on Friday.

Alan McMenemy, a security guard from Glasgow, was abducted in 2007 as he and three colleagues were guarding a computer consultant working in the Iraqi ministry of finance. Scores of militia men disguised as police officers took over the ministry and abducted the five Britons.

Why did it take so long to return his body?

Related

Hostage Remains to be Returned
January 5, 2012

Iraq militants refuse to hand over Briton
By Ahmad al-Rubaye, AFP, July 9, 2011

Alan McMenemy of Scotland
March 21, 2010

Hostage Remains to be Returned

Breaking news this morning from the BBC in London regarding Alan McMenemy, the last of the security guards seized as hostages in 2007.

Iraqi militia offer to return Briton Alan McMenemy's body
BBC, January 5, 2012

The Iraqi militia that kidnapped five Britons in 2007 has said it will hand over the body of the last missing man, who it said was "killed in a clash".

UK authorities had suspected Alan McMenemy, 34, from Glasgow, was dead.

My sincere condolences to his friends and family.

Related

Iraq militants refuse to hand over Briton
By Ahmad al-Rubaye, AFP, July 9, 2011

Alan McMenemy of Scotland
March 21, 2010

Missing iPad Article

An iPad article includes an interview with members of the von Ackermann family.

Agony Over Missing
By Kase Wickham, The Daily, December 25, 2011

Also a short summary at The Daily blog:Americans won’t be home for Christmas because they’re still missing in Iraq
The Daily blog, December 25, 2011

Although Operation Iraqi Freedom ended last week, the families of 4 Americans still officially categorized as missing in Iraq haven’t stopped searching yet.

Unfortunately, I don't have an iPad so I don't have access to the article. I guess this means I am officially entering into the knowledge divide of the haves and the have nots.

The Unknown

Now that the War in Iraq is winding down, there's some renewed interest in those Americans still missing in Iraq.

By my own primitive accounting standards, there are 18 missing Americans - a number that includes those presumed deceased. A name - a person - remains on the list until their remains are found and identified.

The List includes 9 unknown names. That unknowingess is uncomfortable. There's something lonely about a missing person who is also unidentified. Somewhere out there, someone knows them.

An eccentric elderly man who lived in my neighborhood passed away a few months back. I just recently found out his body is still lying in a refrigerator at the morgue, waiting for family to come and claim him. Problem is, he was mentally ill. He was quiet, polite, orderly, well-spoken and totally out of touch with reality. He saw coded messages in donut displays about clandestine deliveries of Chinese missile.

It's a bit of a guess if he really has any family. Some bits and pieces of his life were true - he really was a lawyer who graduated from an Ivy League school - but a great cloud of mystery hangs over much of what he shared during a cup of coffee. But here's the thing - he knew people and he had friends. He still has friends and we're trying to figure out what to do about his body at the morgue so he doesn't end up in an unmarked grave.

It's in that same spirit, that I'd really like to find the names that belong to the Unknown missing, fitting together a broken world.

Americans Missing in Iraq - table of names last updated on August 13, 2011

Eight Years of Godot

Strange how time passes so quickly.

The first blog post I ever wrote about the strange disappearance of Kirk von Ackermann was eight years ago today. At the time, the post quoted a short blurb from a San Diego, California television station. A longer story appeared in the UK Telegraph followed by the San Francisco Chronicle - both written by Colin Freeman. Von Ackermann is still missing and is, in fact, the longest missing American in Iraq.

A little over two months after von Ackermann disappeared, his colleague, Ryan Manelick, was killed in a drive by shooting, on his birthday no less. Colin Freeman again wrote an article about Manelick's death but it took over a year before it was published.

Well, still here. Still waiting for something. Call it, Godot.

On blogging & secrecy

Over the years, a wide range of people of diverse backgrounds have been gracious enough to write to me. It's rather stunning really. I'm extremely grateful that they were willing to share their knowledge and experience with me.

Some correspondents I have had the pleasure to meet in person. Such meetings allow greater discussion and frankly, the ability to discuss things that just can't be put in writing for a variety of reasons. Reasons such as privacy, national security issues, classified information, possible slander or libel, and just protecting sources because they don't want to be identified. There's some information I still sit on years after the fact just because I feel it would unnecessarily hurt some folks feelings. I'm a bit of a softee that way.

I'll give an example.

I know who hijacked the domain registration for John Dawkins company mesopotamiagroup.com and I know why the person(s) did it. Here's the thing. The actual hijacking - who did it and why - is not important. But what is important is what the hijacking tells us about the interpersonal dynamics behind the scenes at Dawkins' predecessor logistics company, Ultra Services. Those interpersonal dynamics are vitally important to understanding the various parties different motivations. It is my own belief that understanding these motivations is the key to unlock the mystery of what happened to Kirk von Ackermann and Ryan Manelick back in 2003.

So there's one minor secret that I don't feel I can reveal in public.

There are at minimum two more secrets that I would like to reveal but can't for the various reasons listed above. I trust the different sources and have no reason to doubt the veracity of the information. Assuming it's true, it should take investigators less than 2 weeks to solve both the disappearance of Kirk von Ackermann and the murder of his colleague, Ryan Manelick. It is my understanding that investigators have access to the same information that I do but bias and a predisposition to a presumption of guilt has slightly derailed their case. One of these days a fresh set of eyes will pick up the cold case files from CID and set things back on course.

Meanwhile, bit by bit, it does seem that secrets eventually out themselves. A recent outing, of course, being the name of the counter terrorism group that Kirk von Ackermann was a member of - DO5 or the Asymmetric Threat Division.

So that's one down with more still to come. It's just a matter of time.

Hopefully, I'll still be around to link to the final story and write the closing post for this blog.

Ryan Manelick Remembered

Brief mention today of Ryan Manelick in a memorial article at the Intelligencer Journal/Lancaster New Era. According to his obituary, he had family in the area, his mother and grandfather. His remains were eventually buried there. Manelick and Kirk von Ackermann were two of Iraq's earliest civilian casualties.

9/11: A decade of personal tragedy for countians
By Jon Rutter, Lancaster Online, September 11, 2011

A total of 18 men and one woman with ties to Lancaster County have been lost as a consequence of the decade-long war on terror. [...]

A second theater of war opened in Iraq in March 2003, with the George W. Bush administration contending that Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein was hiding weapons of mass destruction.

Lancaster County's military-related casualties began in 2003, when Ryan Manelick, a defense contractor, was shot and killed in Baghdad.

Actually, Ryan Manelick was killed about an hour outside of Baghdad, just south of Balad, in what was reported as 'Addujayal, Iraq' - likely Al Dujail - in a report issued by the US Department of State (see reference here). A map of the area is below.

The murder of Ryan Manelick remains unsolved.


View al Dujail, Iraq in a larger map

DO5 in the News

Jeffrey Kaye and Jason Leopold have a new article on the former military intelligence unit, DO5, and its work tracking Osama bin Laden over at Truthout. Kirk von Ackermann, the longest missing American in Iraq, while serving in the US Air Force, was a member of DO5. DO5 also known as the Asymmetric Threat Division, was created by the Director of Intelligence of Joint Forces Command.

New Documents Suggest DoD Watchdog Covered Up Intelligence Unit's Work Tracking 9/11 Terrorists
By Jeffrey Kaye and Jason Leopold
Truthout, September 9, 2011

Declassified powerpoint slides obtained by FOIA accompany the article. I'm a bit curious if anyone has filed an FOIA for the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) mentioned on Slide #2. (I like paper trails....)

Also worth your attention, there's an interview with author Jeffrey Kaye on theReal News.com discussing his research.



So. Still blogging. Anniversary of Kirk von Ackermann's disappearance is coming up - number 8. And still no answers.

Addendum:

Additional commentary and discussion with Jeffrey Kaye over at the Dissenter at FireDogLake.

IG Report Cover-up: Top Military Officials Hid Evidence of Pre-9/11 Al Qaeda Intelligence
By Jeffrey Kaye, September 10, 2011

In particular, Kaye's commentary is worth reading carefully. He notes, "...The falsification was meant in particular to hide the work of the 9-person unit within JFIC, known as the Asymmetrical Threats Division, or DO5 in military lingo."

The following 6 individuals were at some point associated with the Asymmetric Threat Division during the tenure of Captain Kirk von Ackermann between November 1999 into 2000 (exact end date unknown).

Commander Rear Admiral Rose LeVitre, USN
Director Captain Janice M. Dundas USN
Captain Stephen F. Santez Jr., USN
Division Head Major Oliver Wright III, US Army
Deputy Division Head John Rodriguez NCIS
Captain Kirk von Ackermann USAF

Abbas Naama

Video at MSNBC: The Road Back with Tom Brokaw

Tom Brokaw reports a story that follows three families through the war in Iraq. From 2002, before the war in Iraq, until present day, Brokaw chronicles the lives of an American soldier who fought in the war; an Iraqi family who was living under the tyranny of Saddam Hussein and an Iraqi American family that returned to Iraq to rebuild their homeland.

Abbas Kareem (Tim) Naama returned to Iraq but has been missing since he was abducted in Baghdad on September 27, 2005.

There are several interviews with Lieutenant Colonel Kate Van Auken (US Army) who I am going to guess is with the Defense Prisoner of War Missing Personnel Office (DPMO). In Part 6, she is seen handling flyers, with two brief views of missing Americans, Dean Sadek and Aban Elias.

Additional commentary from the MSNBC producer:

On the road back, Americans go missing in Iraq

By Justin Balding, Dateline NBC, August 7, 2011

Abbas Naama is one of 14 Americans missing in Iraq.

Related reading

Americans Missing in Iraq
Last updated: August 13, 2011

Missing Men

I somehow missed this article when it first appeared back in May. I honestly can't figure out how I missed it. Anyway...

The author provides two new names and a different spelling for Bob Hamza, which I will add to the chart of Americans Missing in Iraq. Dates, however, continue to remain elusive.

With Withdrawal Looming, Trails Grow Cold for Americans Missing in Iraq
By Jack Healy, New York Times, May 21, 2011

The last Americans missing in Iraq followed disparate paths to an uncertain fate. They arrived from Indiana and North Carolina, Chicago and Denver. They came out of a sense of duty, in search of a paycheck, or hoping to reclaim a homeland they had fled decades earlier.

But the lives of the eight men — seven private contractors and the only American service member who remains unaccounted — are a painful fragment of the war’s legacy, a haunting piece of unfinished business that the military will leave behind when it withdraws by the end of the year. [...]

Numerically speaking, the missing Americans — Jeffrey Ake, Aban Elias, Abbas Kareem Naama, Neenus Khoshaba, Bob Hamze, Dean Sadek, Hussain al-Zurufi and Staff Sgt. Ahmed Altaie — are little more than a footnote in Iraq.

JFIC Project

Trying to put together a table of who's who at Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) and it's subordinate, Joint Forces Intelligence Command (JFIC) during the critical 1999 to 2001 time frame. It's in table format and can be found here:

USJFCOM

Most of the information in the chart has been gleaned from online biographies of retired military personnel who have entered the private sector. Some of the names and dates are from the Inspector General report. Kirk von Ackermann first reported to JFIC for Information Operations in November 1999. He was quickly attached to the asymmetric threat group, DO5.

I'll update the chart as more information becomes available.

Review of Joint Forces Intelligence Command Response to 9/11 Commission
Deputy Inspector General for Intelligence
United States Department of Defense
September 23, 2008
Declassified March 5, 2010

Rear Admiral Rosanne LeVitre, USN

In his May 8, 2006, Formal Complaint to DoD Inspector General [1], an unidentified intelligence officer known only as IRON MAN wrote:

(U) Contrary to JFIC's formal report to the JCS staff, JFIC had a direct and assigned purview on international terrorism against the U.S., to include the operations of al-Qa'ida and the 9/11 attackers. JFIC was directly responsible to both Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) and its subordinate, Joint Task Force-Civil Support (JTF-CS) for all-source intelligence analysis of internationai terrorism against the U.S. To ensure the quality of such analysis,  JFlC's commanding officer [redacted] established the Asymmetric Threat Branch (DO5), charged with reporting on asymmetric threats, especially terrorism. [redacted] was subsequently promoted to JFCOM J2. As a RADM and PACOM J2, she established another Asymmetric Threat branch at PACOM.)

It is my belief that the commanding officer described above is Rear Admiral (retired) Rosanne M. LeVitre, US Navy.

Left - Screen capture of the online biography at the website for The Consensus for American Security for Rear Admiral Rosanne M. LeVitre, US Navy (Retired). The biography includes a color photograph and also notes her '...considerable experience in the interagency intelligence arena.'

In fact, the online biography [2] opens with this sentence:

Rear Admiral Rosanne "Rose" LeVitre was the first woman intelligence specialist selected for flag rank in the United States Navy.

According to the biography, Rear Admiral LeVitre was also in the right places doing the right things with the right people at the right time.

After [Gulf War I], she was sent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Current Operations Directorate (J3). Among her duties was that of JCS representative to a National Security Council. She later served at two joint intelligence centers (JICs), one of which she commanded. After her command tour, she became the Director for Intelligence (J2), U.S. Joint Forces Command, Norfolk, VA.

On selection to flag rank, Rear Admiral (ret) LeVitre assumed the position as Director for Intelligence (J2), U.S. Pacific Command, Honolulu, Hawaii. From 2000 to late 2003, she oversaw intelligence operations at a time of increased tensions, from the EP-3 aircraft incident with China, to the Global War on Terrorism, and crises involving India-Pakistan and Korea. She conceived of and oversaw implementation of an expanded information sharing architecture, involving traditional allied partners, non-traditional alliances and non-DOD entities to include the FBI, state and local authorities. [2]

Please re-read that last sentence again.

She conceived of and oversaw implementation of an expanded information sharing architecture, involving traditional allied partners, non-traditional alliances and non-DOD entities to include the FBI, state and local authorities.

Of the Asymmetric Threat Division (DO5), the Defense Inspector General for Intelligence wrote this:

In 1999, the Joint Forces Intelligence Command created the Asymmetric Threat Division to take a non-traditional approach to analysis. The Asymmetric Threat Division provided current intelligence briefings and produced the Worldwide Terrorist Threat Summary in support of the Intelligence Director for the United States Joint Forces Command. The Asymmetric Threat Division also provided support to the Joint Task Force-Civil Support. The Joint Task Force-Civil Support assisted civil authorities with disaster assistance. [3]

IRON MAN pretty much alludes to the fact that DO5 was ahead of its time:

(U) The Asymmetric Threat Branch in JFIC was a forerunner of current all-source fusion centers. Unlike other analytical offices in the intelligence cornmunity, DO5 members had
a wide mix of skilis in all six intelligence disciplines - HUMINT, OSINT, COMINT, ELINT, IMINT, and MASINT. Consequently, DO5 was able to develop and use all-source, original analysis in a manner probably then unprecedented within the intelligence community. [1]

The Asymmetric Threat Division was Rear Admiral LeVitre's baby, making her truly a visionary in the intelligence community. But according to IRON MAN, shortly after LeVitre left, her replacement shut down DO5.

(U) [redacted] the last JFIC commanding officer under which I served, was adamantly opposed to JFIC conducting any original analysis of al-Qa'ida, and directed such work be stopped in late 2000-early 2001. [1]

And that action - actively shutting down DO5 - puts a very different spin on things.

Someone please tell me that DO5 wasn't shut down because of sexism and that as a direct result, 2,753 people died on 9/11 just because the boys club didn't take girls.

Because if that's the case, that's some seriously [redacted] up [redacted].

ADDENDUM

Flag officer announcements from the archives of the Department of Defense.

Flag Officer Assignments
U.S. Department of Defense, Press Release, December 8, 2003

WASHINGTON (NNS) -- Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Vern Clark announced the following flag officer assignments Dec. 8:

Rear Adm. (lower half) Rosanne M. Levitre is being assigned as director, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, FORCEnet, N6/N7, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Arlington, Va. Levitre is currently serving as director for intelligence, J2, U.S. Pacific Command, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.

Flag Officer Announcements
U.S. Department of Defense, Press Release, May 25, 2000

Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen announced today that the President has
nominated the following U.S. Navy officers for promotion to rear admiral (lower half):

SPECIAL DUTY OFFICER (INTELLIGENCE)

Levitre, Rosanne M. Director of Intelligence, J2, [NL] U.S. Joint Forces Command AUG 1999 TO DATE Norfolk, Va.

Flag and General Officer Assignments
U.S. Department of Defense, Press Release, June 30, 2000

The following are flag and general officer assignments as announced by the Departments of the Navy and Army.

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT
Levitre, Rosanne M.
Rear Admiral
(Lower Half) (Selectee)
Director of Intelligence
J2, U.S. Joint Forces Command
Norfolk, Va.

NEW ASSIGNMENT
Director for Intelligence
J2, U.S. Pacific Command
Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii

References

[1] Attachment - Unclassified FOIA Response PDF
April 8, 2011
Formal Complaint to DoD Inspector General
re: JFIC and Congressional Inquiry
May 8, 2006

[2] See: Members » Rear Admiral Rosanne M. LeVitre
The Consensus for American Security

[3] Review of Joint Forces Intelligence Command Response to 9/11 Commission PDF
Deputy Inspector General for Intelligence
United States Department of Defense
September 23, 2008
Declassified March 5, 2010
From the Federation of American Scientists

Report: Intelligence Unit Told Before 9/11 to Stop Tracking Bin Laden
By Jeffrey Kaye, Truthout, May 23, 2011

Abbreviations - used above

COMINT - Communications Intelligence
DO5 - Asymmetric Threat Division
DOD - Department of Defense
ELINT - Electronic Intelligence
FBI - Federal Bureau of Investigation
HUMINT- Intelligence
IMINT- Imagery Intelligence
J2 - Director for Intelligence
JCS - Joint Chiefs of Staff
JFCOM - Joint Forces Command
JFIC - Joint Forces Intelligence Command
JIC - Joint Intelligence Center
JTF-CS - Joint Task Force- Civil Support
MASINT- Measurement and Signature Intelligence
OSINT- Open Source Intelligence
PACOM - Pacific Command
RADM - Rear Admiral
US - United States of America
USN - United States Navy

What did Kirk see?

More thinking out loud.....and nit picking.

In November 1999, Captain Kirk von Ackermann, USAF, arrived to work at Joint Forces Intelligence Command in Virginia, where he was assigned to counter terrorism.

In trying to describe her husband and how his work was slowly consuming his entire life, Megan von Ackermann wrote a very short passage that took place somewhere in the vicinity of Virginia:

Dual Lives
By Megan von Ackermann, Missing in Iraq, September 5, 2006

Like the time [Kirk] glanced over as we passed a local bank, stiffened and muttered something about 'so they use that one...' I think he had recognized someone going into the bank, and now part of him was concerned with working out how to use this unexpected windfall of information.

Assuming what was written is accurate, it means JFIC more or less lied, at least once, in its response to the Deputy Inspector General for Intelligence.

Appendix B. (U) Scanned JFIC Response:

2. Did your agency have information prior to Sept 11, 2001, to suggest that international terrorist cells were operating within the United States? If so, please set this information aside for review by the staff of the Joint inquiry.

ANSWER: No, but prior to Sept 11, 2001, neither JFIC nor JFCOM tracked terrorist activity in the United States. The United States was not part of JFCOM's AOR.

Then why was a JFIC counter terrorism officer so interested in someone he saw outside of a bank? Why did that officer refer to 'they' - plural - unless the subject observed was connected to or a member of an already known group that - at best - was only 'suspected' of ties to terrorists?

What did Kirk see and who exactly did he pass that information on to? More importantly, what did the recipient do with it?

References

Attachment - Unclassified FOIA Response PDF
FOIA response
April 8, 2011
Formal Complaint to DoD Inspector General
re: JFIC and Congressional Inquiry
May 8, 2006

Review of Joint Forces Intelligence Command Response to 9/11 Commission PDF
Deputy Inspector General for Intelligence
United States Department of Defense
September 23, 2008
Declassified March 5, 2010
From the Federation of American Scientists

Report: Intelligence Unit Told Before 9/11 to Stop Tracking Bin Laden
By Jeffrey Kaye, Truthout, May 23, 2011

Kidnapped

Heads up.

Colin Freeman, who first wrote about the disappearance of Kirk von Ackermann, has a new book coming out on his own kidnapping in Somalia. Today, Freeman is chief foreign correspondent on The Sunday Telegraph.

Description from the publisher.

Kidnapped: Life As A Somali Pirate Hostage
By Colin Freeman, Monday Books, June 2011

Somalia: the world’s most notorious failed state, and one of the most dangerous places on earth.

It’s a land of pirates, criminal gangs and militant Islamists, which even the military might of the U.S.A. couldn’t tame. With no government for two decades, there can be few worse places to be taken hostage...

This is Sunday Telegraph foreign correspondent Colin Freeman’s account of being kidnapped on the lawless Somali pirate coast - and how it became a haven for modern-day buccaneers.

There's also a short piece by Colin Freeman at the BBC.

Somalia: What is it like to be kidnapped?
By Colin Freeman, BBC, June 29, 2011

The Missing Man in 2D

Gosh - for a long time, I've wanted a hard copy of the Missing Man for reading and reference offline. After some research, I finally settled on a primitive PDF format as it allows the embedded links to remain active. It's not perfect but it works. The least I can do is share it with anyone who wants a copy. (I plan to update Volume 4 some point in the future) 

The Missing Man blog posts are divided into 5 separate volumes. They are available for download (free) through Google docs.

Volume 1 - Introduction, Overview, Index, Bibliography

Volume 2 - November 12, 2003 - May 13, 2008

Volume 3 - May 25, 2008 - March 28, 2010

Volume 4 - March 31, 2010 - June 13, 2011

Volume 5 - Appendix

Download Directions

To download or print each volume, after following the link, just click on 'File' in the upper left hand corner. See insert below.

Asymmetric Threat Division - opposition

Review of Joint Forces Intelligence Command Response to 9/11 Commission PDF
Deputy Inspector General for Intelligence
United States Department of Defense
September 23, 2008
Declassified March 5, 2010
From the Federation of American Scientists

(U) JFIC's Asymmetric Threat Division (DO5)

(U) In 1999, the [Joint Forces Intelligence Command]created the Asymmetric Threat Division (DO5) to take a non-traditional approach to analysis. The Director of Operations recruited JFIC personnel from the command based upon their counterintelligence and counterterrorism expertise. The DO5 provided current intelligence briefings and produced the Worldwide Terrorist Threat Summary in support of the USJFCOM Intelligence staff. The DO5 also provided support to the Joint Task Force-Civil Support (JTF-CS). The JTF-CS assisted civil authorities with disaster assistance. The DO5 supported the JTF-CS exercises by establishing fictional terrorist organizations that would mimic real world terrorist groups.

Reviewing Jeffrey Kaye and Jason Leopold's two recent articles over at Truth Out and the related documents. Thinking a bit out loud here and feeling my way around it all.

Anyway, what I am trying to understand is this: why were commanding officers so opposed to the Asymmetric Threat Division's intelligence analysis regarding al Qaeda? Just what the heck was going on over there - was it a Navy thing or was there more to it than that?

Principals

Pieced together from various sources, a very rough list of 'principals' from the 2000-2001 time period. Keep in mind there's some overlap with people coming and going, promotions, etc. Some of the titles might be wrong (my error) and there's a bunch of unknowns. At least it's a starting point.

Admiral Harold W. Gehman, Jr. served as Commander In Chief U.S. Joint Forces Command from September 1997 until his retirement September 2000. His replacement was General Kernan.

Lieutenant General Thomas N. Burnette, Jr. served as Deputy Commander In Chief U.S. Joint Forces Command from July 1999 until his retirement September 2000. His replacement was Vice Admiral Mayer.

• General William F. Kernan, US Army - Commander in Chief, US Joint Forces Command
• Vice Admiral Martin J. Mayer, USN - Deputy Commander in Chief, US JFCOM
• Major General Jack R. Holbein Jr., USAF - Chief of Staff, US JFCOM
• Colonel Daniel P. Bolger, US Army - Director, Strategy and Analysis, US JFCOM
• [unknown] - Director of Operations, US JFCOM
• [unknown] - Deputy Director of Operations, US JFCOM
• Vice Admiral Robert B. Murrett, USN - Director for Intelligence, US JFCOM
• [unknown] - Deputy Director for Intelligence, US JFCOM
• [unknown] - Director for Intelligence Operations, US JFCOM
• [unknown] - Deputy Director for Intelligence Operations, US JFCOM
• Captain Janice M. Dundas, USN - Commander in Chief, Joint Forces Intelligence Command
• [unknown] - Deputy Commander in Chief,  JFIC
• [unknown] - Director of Operations, JFIC
• [unknown] - Deputy Director of Operations, JFIC
• Major Oliver Wright III, US Army - Division Head, Asymmetric Threat Division, JFIC
• John Rodriguez, NCIS - Deputy Division Head, Asymmetric Threat Division, JFIC
• Captain Stephen F. Santez Jr., USN - [title unknown], Asymmetric Threat Division, JFIC
• Captain Kirk von Ackermann, USAF - Deputy, Asymmetric Threat Division, JFIC
• [unknown] - Operations Officer, Asymmetric Threat Division, JFIC
• [unknown] - Counterintelligence Security Officer, US JFCOM
• Major General Bruce M. Lawlor, US Army - Commander, Joint Task Force - Civil Support 
• [unknown] - Deputy Commander, JTF-CS
• [unknown] - Chief of Staff, JTF-CS

Just from a history standpoint, 2000 - 2001 is a fascinating period for the US military and in particular, Joint Forces Command: it's all about transformation. Commander in Chief (CINC), General William F. Kernan, created a new directorate tasking a team, Mayer, Holbein and Bolger, to manage transformation strategy for JFCOM.

The CINC's charter to this team was simple: infuse joint forces with new ideas, and change the way JFCOM will fight. [...]

Rigorous simulation and gaming must be pursued in response to new or emerging technologies and concepts. [1]

Infuse joint forces with new ideas and rigorous simulations....only, not so much.

Oddly enough, Kernan was worried about procuring laser-guided missiles to replenish what was lost during Kosovo, essentially bringing missiles to a knife fight. Meanwhile, a new subordinate organization - the Joint Task Force-Civil Support - was tasked to "serve as the U.S. Joint Forces Command lead for WMD events in the United States"[2]. To prepare, JTF-CS was conducting quarterly training exercises (simulations) based on chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high yield explosives incidents. The Navy - who held the purse strings - wasn't so hot about sponsoring Joint Forces Command. [3]

From Jeffrey Kaye's source materials, IRON MAN on page 2 of his Formal Complaint to DoD Inspector General [4] writes:

[The Asymmetric Threat Division] DO5 began preparing a wide range of original analysis on asymmetric warfare, especially terrorism, from mid-1998 until mid-2001. This analysis included: [...]

(U) Reports on the most likely targets for domestic and international terrorists both within the US and abroad, as well as adjunct targets during a traditional war. The most sensitive of these reports were those identifying targets within the US, developing scenarios, analysis of commonalities for use in planning responses and recommendations for preventative action. This US tasking was given by JTF-CS.

JTF-CS was clearly asking DO5 to help prepare realistic scenarios for its training exercises which meshes with what Megan von Ackermann has written [5] about her husband, that Captain Kirk von Ackermann was involved with designing 'readiness exercises'. In a statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Major General Bruce M. Lawlor, the first Commander of Joint Task Force - Civil Support (JTF-CS) provided some details about JTF-CS. [6]

In addition to planning for real world events, JTF-CS conducts quarterly training exercises that focus on planning and deployment for specific types of CBRNE incidents. To date we have conducted such exercises in each of the 5 areas with which we are concerned: chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and high yield explosive events. We have learned to create a base plan for the most dangerous event and prepare branches and sequels for other possible incidents. By doing so, we have reduced our response planning time considerably.

Planning for real world events...against real adversaries, like Al Qaeda. Lawlor casually mentions in his statement that one such exercise was quietly conducted live during the Presidential inauguration of George W. Bush.

The work of the Asymmetric Threat Division - and Captain Kirk von Ackermann - starts coming into focus and becomes much more tangible. These guys aren't sitting around playing video games, they're playing for real. The intelligence is real. The enemy is real. The targets - real. The scenarios - real. The maps - real. The threat - real.

So, why were they getting shut down orders? Who didn't want them trained and ready to fight the bad guys?

Again, from Jeffrey Kaye's source materials, IRON MAN states on page 5 of his Formal Complaint to DoD Inspector General [7]:

[U] [redacted] the last JFIC commanding officer under which I served adamantly opposed JFIC conducting any original analysis of al-Qa'ida, and directed work be stopped in late 2000 - early 2001, and enforced that order upon my departure.

Review of Joint Forces Intelligence Command Response to 9/11 Commission, Appendix C - a March 25, 2002 letter attached to the FOIA response signed by Major John A. Robinson, USAF, [8] clearly identifies Captain Janice M. Dundas, US Navy, as Commander of the JFIC. Back in March 2000, Dundas signed Captain Kirk von Ackermann's letter of appreciation.

In the section marked, JFIC Response to Congress [9], page 14, the Inspector General states:

(U) The JFIC's Commanding Officer established a command atmosphere which highlighted intelligence oversight and mission focus. The DO5 Operations Officer stated that the JFIC was very cautious over the support that was provided to the JTF-CS based on intelligence oversight guidelines. The Deputy Director of Intelligence stated that JFIC Commanding Officer would repeatedly ask for written certification to justify any tasking to any department or division. He further stated that DO5 had no theater specific mission. The subsequent Deputy Director of Intelligence directed him to stop tracking Usama Bin Laden. The Commanding Officer stated that the tracking of Usama Bin Laden did not fall in JFIC's mission. The Commanding Officer also stated that a couple of folks doing analysis of Afghanistan terrorist training camps was perceived as excess capability when it's not your AOR [Area of Operations] and that the issues were not in JFIC's swim lane.

Someone needs to ask Dundas what she was afraid of - whose toesies were getting stepped on. Was it coming from above her? Did she personally object to Major General Bruce M. Lawlor, Commander of JTF-CS? Petty, yes, but not unheard of.

Vice Admiral Martin J. Mayer, also Navy, was the Deputy Commander in Chief. Prior to serving as DCINC, Mayer was Director for Strategy Requirements and Integration at JFCOM and part of Kernan's 'team' to manage transformation strategy for JFCOM.

IRON MAN notes in his Formal Complaint that "...senior JFCOM staff including the DCINC and J3" were present at the first Asymmetric Threat Division briefing titled, "The WMD Threat to the US."[10] After the briefing, it had been noted that the national military terrorism exercise committment for FY01 involved a cruise ship.

A few months later, Mayer was nominated for appointment to Vice Admiral and Deputy Commander of US Joint Forces on September 15, 2000. Within a month, on October 12, 2000, the USS Cole was the victim of a suicide bombing in Yemen. 17 sailors died that day. By December, CNN was reporting that Al Qaeda was responsible. [11]

In the Afterword to the book Touching History: The Untold Story of the Drama That Unfolded in the Skies Over America on 9/11, Major General (retired) Larry Arnold 1st Air Force and the Continental US North American Air Defense Command Region wrote:

Just two weeks before September 11, 2001, I had met with Vice Admiral Martin Mayer, the deputy commander in chief of Joint Forces Command located in Norfolk, Virginia. He had informed me that he intended to kill all funding for a plan my command had been working on for two years, that would defend against a cruise missile attack by terrorists. While I convinced Admiral Mayer to continue his funding support, he told me in front of my chief of staff, Colonel Alan Scott; Navy Captain David Stewart, the lead on the project; and my executive officer, Lt. Col. Kelley Duckett, that our concern about Osama bin Laden as a possible threat to America was unfounded and that, to repeat, ‘If everyone would just turn off CNN, there wouldn’t be a threat from Osama bin Laden.’ [12]

Mayer's myopic thinking was far from unique. His Commander in Chief, General Kernan, was interviewed for an article shortly after the Cole bombing [13]:

The way the United States deploys its ships and troops overseas, as well as how they are based at home, will be forever changed because of the attack on the destroyer Cole, according to the man responsible for providing forces to America's combat commanders. [...]

The Cole, a $1 billion Arleigh Burke-class destroyer, was attacked Oct. 12 while it refueled in the southern Arabian port of Aden, Yemen. Seventeen sailors from the Norfolk-based ship died and 42 others were injured.

"I don't think anybody could have predicted somebody would come floating up there on a commercially made skiff that had an embedded shape charge in it, come right up against the side of a ship and blow a 40-by-40-foot hole in it," [Kernan] said. "It's incredible they were able to achieve it."

It's not that big of a jump in the imagination from commercial skiff to commercial jet. Within a year, hijackers on a suicide mission would hit the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.

It's like the commanders just couldn't face up to a very real war. They couldn't - or wouldn't - see the elephant in the room - asymmetric threats from groups like Al Qaeda.

It's all so.....disappointing.

References

New Documents Claim Intelligence on Bin Laden, al-Qaeda Targets Withheld From Congress' 9/11 Probe
By Jeffrey Kaye and Jason Leopold, Truthout, June 13, 2011

Attachment - Unclassified FOIA Response PDF - includes:
FOIA response
April 8, 2011
Formal Complaint to DoD Inspector General
re: JFIC and Congressional Inquiry
May 8, 2006

Report: Intelligence Unit Told Before 9/11 to Stop Tracking Bin Laden
By Jeffrey Kaye, Truthout, May 23, 2011

Review of Joint Forces Intelligence Command Response to 9/11 Commission PDF
Deputy Inspector General for Intelligence
United States Department of Defense
September 23, 2008
Declassified March 5, 2010
From the Federation of American Scientists

[1] A Study of Joint Transformation at United States Joint Forces Command
By Colonel Lorraine E. Tyacke, United States Army, April 9, 2002

[2] Management of National Guard, Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Teams
Office of the Inspector General, Department of Defense
Audit Report No. D-2001-043
See: Coordination With Other Organizations
January 31, 2001

[3] Tyacke, page 8

[4] Attachment - Unclassified FOIA Response PDF - includes:
FOIA response
April 8, 2011
Formal Complaint to DoD Inspector General
re: JFIC and Congressional Inquiry
May 8, 2006

[5] Getting to Iraq part two: Counter Terrorism
By Megan von Ackermann, Missing in Iraq, March 24, 2006

[6] Statement of Major General Bruce M. Lawlor PDF
US Army, Commander, Joint Task Force-Civil Support,
US Joint Forces Command
Before the Senate Armed Services Committee on Status
Update of JTF-CS
May 1, 2001

[7] Unclassified FOIA Response, page 5

[8] Review of Joint Forces Intelligence Command Response to 9/11 Commission
Deputy Inspector General for Intelligence
United States Department of Defense
September 23, 2008
Declassified March 5, 2010

[9] Ibid, page 14

[10]Unclassified FOIA Response, page 3

[11] USS Cole plot began after embassy attacks, investigator says
David Ensor, Chris Plante and Peter Bergen, CNN, December 20, 2000

[12] Touching History: The Untold Story of the Drama That Unfolded in the Skies Over America on 9/11, By Lynn Spencer, Free Press, June 3, 2008
Afterword, page 285-291, by Major General (retired) Larry Arnold 1st Air Force and the Continental US North American Air Defense Command Region at Tyndall Air Force base near Panama City, FL.

[13] Cole Alters Military's Perception of Security; Joint Forces Chief Assesses Challenges at Overseas Posts, By Jack Dorsey, The Virginian-Pilot (archive $) January 28, 2001

Additional Reading

Military Support of Civil Authorities—
A New Focus for a New Millennium
Major General Bruce M. Lawlor
, Commander, 
Joint Task Force–Civil Support
October 2000 (Updated September 2001)

Report of the Joint Inquiry into the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001 PDF - By the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (declassified version)
S. REPT. NO. 107- 351 and H. REPT. NO. 107-792
December 20, 2002

9-11 Commission Report
The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
July 22, 2004

9/11 Commission - Appendix C - Hearings - witnesses, etc

Notes

Admiral Harold W. Gehman, Jr. served as Commander In Chief U.S. Joint Forces Command from September 1997 until his retirement September 2000

Vice Admiral Robert B. Murrett, USN served as the director for Intelligence, US Joint Forces Command, from August 10, 2000 through January 25, 2002