Missing iPad Article

An iPad article includes an interview with members of the von Ackermann family.

Agony Over Missing
By Kase Wickham, The Daily, December 25, 2011

Also a short summary at The Daily blog:Americans won’t be home for Christmas because they’re still missing in Iraq
The Daily blog, December 25, 2011

Although Operation Iraqi Freedom ended last week, the families of 4 Americans still officially categorized as missing in Iraq haven’t stopped searching yet.

Unfortunately, I don't have an iPad so I don't have access to the article. I guess this means I am officially entering into the knowledge divide of the haves and the have nots.

The Unknown

Now that the War in Iraq is winding down, there's some renewed interest in those Americans still missing in Iraq.

By my own primitive accounting standards, there are 18 missing Americans - a number that includes those presumed deceased. A name - a person - remains on the list until their remains are found and identified.

The List includes 9 unknown names. That unknowingess is uncomfortable. There's something lonely about a missing person who is also unidentified. Somewhere out there, someone knows them.

An eccentric elderly man who lived in my neighborhood passed away a few months back. I just recently found out his body is still lying in a refrigerator at the morgue, waiting for family to come and claim him. Problem is, he was mentally ill. He was quiet, polite, orderly, well-spoken and totally out of touch with reality. He saw coded messages in donut displays about clandestine deliveries of Chinese missile.

It's a bit of a guess if he really has any family. Some bits and pieces of his life were true - he really was a lawyer who graduated from an Ivy League school - but a great cloud of mystery hangs over much of what he shared during a cup of coffee. But here's the thing - he knew people and he had friends. He still has friends and we're trying to figure out what to do about his body at the morgue so he doesn't end up in an unmarked grave.

It's in that same spirit, that I'd really like to find the names that belong to the Unknown missing, fitting together a broken world.

Americans Missing in Iraq - table of names last updated on August 13, 2011

Eight Years of Godot

Strange how time passes so quickly.

The first blog post I ever wrote about the strange disappearance of Kirk von Ackermann was eight years ago today. At the time, the post quoted a short blurb from a San Diego, California television station. A longer story appeared in the UK Telegraph followed by the San Francisco Chronicle - both written by Colin Freeman. Von Ackermann is still missing and is, in fact, the longest missing American in Iraq.

A little over two months after von Ackermann disappeared, his colleague, Ryan Manelick, was killed in a drive by shooting, on his birthday no less. Colin Freeman again wrote an article about Manelick's death but it took over a year before it was published.

Well, still here. Still waiting for something. Call it, Godot.

On blogging & secrecy

Over the years, a wide range of people of diverse backgrounds have been gracious enough to write to me. It's rather stunning really. I'm extremely grateful that they were willing to share their knowledge and experience with me.

Some correspondents I have had the pleasure to meet in person. Such meetings allow greater discussion and frankly, the ability to discuss things that just can't be put in writing for a variety of reasons. Reasons such as privacy, national security issues, classified information, possible slander or libel, and just protecting sources because they don't want to be identified. There's some information I still sit on years after the fact just because I feel it would unnecessarily hurt some folks feelings. I'm a bit of a softee that way.

I'll give an example.

I know who hijacked the domain registration for John Dawkins company mesopotamiagroup.com and I know why the person(s) did it. Here's the thing. The actual hijacking - who did it and why - is not important. But what is important is what the hijacking tells us about the interpersonal dynamics behind the scenes at Dawkins' predecessor logistics company, Ultra Services. Those interpersonal dynamics are vitally important to understanding the various parties different motivations. It is my own belief that understanding these motivations is the key to unlock the mystery of what happened to Kirk von Ackermann and Ryan Manelick back in 2003.

So there's one minor secret that I don't feel I can reveal in public.

There are at minimum two more secrets that I would like to reveal but can't for the various reasons listed above. I trust the different sources and have no reason to doubt the veracity of the information. Assuming it's true, it should take investigators less than 2 weeks to solve both the disappearance of Kirk von Ackermann and the murder of his colleague, Ryan Manelick. It is my understanding that investigators have access to the same information that I do but bias and a predisposition to a presumption of guilt has slightly derailed their case. One of these days a fresh set of eyes will pick up the cold case files from CID and set things back on course.

Meanwhile, bit by bit, it does seem that secrets eventually out themselves. A recent outing, of course, being the name of the counter terrorism group that Kirk von Ackermann was a member of - DO5 or the Asymmetric Threat Division.

So that's one down with more still to come. It's just a matter of time.

Hopefully, I'll still be around to link to the final story and write the closing post for this blog.

Ryan Manelick Remembered

Brief mention today of Ryan Manelick in a memorial article at the Intelligencer Journal/Lancaster New Era. According to his obituary, he had family in the area, his mother and grandfather. His remains were eventually buried there. Manelick and Kirk von Ackermann were two of Iraq's earliest civilian casualties.

9/11: A decade of personal tragedy for countians
By Jon Rutter, Lancaster Online, September 11, 2011

A total of 18 men and one woman with ties to Lancaster County have been lost as a consequence of the decade-long war on terror. [...]

A second theater of war opened in Iraq in March 2003, with the George W. Bush administration contending that Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein was hiding weapons of mass destruction.

Lancaster County's military-related casualties began in 2003, when Ryan Manelick, a defense contractor, was shot and killed in Baghdad.

Actually, Ryan Manelick was killed about an hour outside of Baghdad, just south of Balad, in what was reported as 'Addujayal, Iraq' - likely Al Dujail - in a report issued by the US Department of State (see reference here). A map of the area is below.

The murder of Ryan Manelick remains unsolved.


View al Dujail, Iraq in a larger map

DO5 in the News

Jeffrey Kaye and Jason Leopold have a new article on the former military intelligence unit, DO5, and its work tracking Osama bin Laden over at Truthout. Kirk von Ackermann, the longest missing American in Iraq, while serving in the US Air Force, was a member of DO5. DO5 also known as the Asymmetric Threat Division, was created by the Director of Intelligence of Joint Forces Command.

New Documents Suggest DoD Watchdog Covered Up Intelligence Unit's Work Tracking 9/11 Terrorists
By Jeffrey Kaye and Jason Leopold
Truthout, September 9, 2011

Declassified powerpoint slides obtained by FOIA accompany the article. I'm a bit curious if anyone has filed an FOIA for the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) mentioned on Slide #2. (I like paper trails....)

Also worth your attention, there's an interview with author Jeffrey Kaye on theReal News.com discussing his research.



So. Still blogging. Anniversary of Kirk von Ackermann's disappearance is coming up - number 8. And still no answers.

Addendum:

Additional commentary and discussion with Jeffrey Kaye over at the Dissenter at FireDogLake.

IG Report Cover-up: Top Military Officials Hid Evidence of Pre-9/11 Al Qaeda Intelligence
By Jeffrey Kaye, September 10, 2011

In particular, Kaye's commentary is worth reading carefully. He notes, "...The falsification was meant in particular to hide the work of the 9-person unit within JFIC, known as the Asymmetrical Threats Division, or DO5 in military lingo."

The following 6 individuals were at some point associated with the Asymmetric Threat Division during the tenure of Captain Kirk von Ackermann between November 1999 into 2000 (exact end date unknown).

Commander Rear Admiral Rose LeVitre, USN
Director Captain Janice M. Dundas USN
Captain Stephen F. Santez Jr., USN
Division Head Major Oliver Wright III, US Army
Deputy Division Head John Rodriguez NCIS
Captain Kirk von Ackermann USAF

Abbas Naama

Video at MSNBC: The Road Back with Tom Brokaw

Tom Brokaw reports a story that follows three families through the war in Iraq. From 2002, before the war in Iraq, until present day, Brokaw chronicles the lives of an American soldier who fought in the war; an Iraqi family who was living under the tyranny of Saddam Hussein and an Iraqi American family that returned to Iraq to rebuild their homeland.

Abbas Kareem (Tim) Naama returned to Iraq but has been missing since he was abducted in Baghdad on September 27, 2005.

There are several interviews with Lieutenant Colonel Kate Van Auken (US Army) who I am going to guess is with the Defense Prisoner of War Missing Personnel Office (DPMO). In Part 6, she is seen handling flyers, with two brief views of missing Americans, Dean Sadek and Aban Elias.

Additional commentary from the MSNBC producer:

On the road back, Americans go missing in Iraq

By Justin Balding, Dateline NBC, August 7, 2011

Abbas Naama is one of 14 Americans missing in Iraq.

Related reading

Americans Missing in Iraq
Last updated: August 13, 2011

Missing Men

I somehow missed this article when it first appeared back in May. I honestly can't figure out how I missed it. Anyway...

The author provides two new names and a different spelling for Bob Hamza, which I will add to the chart of Americans Missing in Iraq. Dates, however, continue to remain elusive.

With Withdrawal Looming, Trails Grow Cold for Americans Missing in Iraq
By Jack Healy, New York Times, May 21, 2011

The last Americans missing in Iraq followed disparate paths to an uncertain fate. They arrived from Indiana and North Carolina, Chicago and Denver. They came out of a sense of duty, in search of a paycheck, or hoping to reclaim a homeland they had fled decades earlier.

But the lives of the eight men — seven private contractors and the only American service member who remains unaccounted — are a painful fragment of the war’s legacy, a haunting piece of unfinished business that the military will leave behind when it withdraws by the end of the year. [...]

Numerically speaking, the missing Americans — Jeffrey Ake, Aban Elias, Abbas Kareem Naama, Neenus Khoshaba, Bob Hamze, Dean Sadek, Hussain al-Zurufi and Staff Sgt. Ahmed Altaie — are little more than a footnote in Iraq.

JFIC Project

Trying to put together a table of who's who at Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) and it's subordinate, Joint Forces Intelligence Command (JFIC) during the critical 1999 to 2001 time frame. It's in table format and can be found here:

USJFCOM

Most of the information in the chart has been gleaned from online biographies of retired military personnel who have entered the private sector. Some of the names and dates are from the Inspector General report. Kirk von Ackermann first reported to JFIC for Information Operations in November 1999. He was quickly attached to the asymmetric threat group, DO5.

I'll update the chart as more information becomes available.

Review of Joint Forces Intelligence Command Response to 9/11 Commission
Deputy Inspector General for Intelligence
United States Department of Defense
September 23, 2008
Declassified March 5, 2010

Rear Admiral Rosanne LeVitre, USN

In his May 8, 2006, Formal Complaint to DoD Inspector General [1], an unidentified intelligence officer known only as IRON MAN wrote:

(U) Contrary to JFIC's formal report to the JCS staff, JFIC had a direct and assigned purview on international terrorism against the U.S., to include the operations of al-Qa'ida and the 9/11 attackers. JFIC was directly responsible to both Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) and its subordinate, Joint Task Force-Civil Support (JTF-CS) for all-source intelligence analysis of internationai terrorism against the U.S. To ensure the quality of such analysis,  JFlC's commanding officer [redacted] established the Asymmetric Threat Branch (DO5), charged with reporting on asymmetric threats, especially terrorism. [redacted] was subsequently promoted to JFCOM J2. As a RADM and PACOM J2, she established another Asymmetric Threat branch at PACOM.)

It is my belief that the commanding officer described above is Rear Admiral (retired) Rosanne M. LeVitre, US Navy.

Left - Screen capture of the online biography at the website for The Consensus for American Security for Rear Admiral Rosanne M. LeVitre, US Navy (Retired). The biography includes a color photograph and also notes her '...considerable experience in the interagency intelligence arena.'

In fact, the online biography [2] opens with this sentence:

Rear Admiral Rosanne "Rose" LeVitre was the first woman intelligence specialist selected for flag rank in the United States Navy.

According to the biography, Rear Admiral LeVitre was also in the right places doing the right things with the right people at the right time.

After [Gulf War I], she was sent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Current Operations Directorate (J3). Among her duties was that of JCS representative to a National Security Council. She later served at two joint intelligence centers (JICs), one of which she commanded. After her command tour, she became the Director for Intelligence (J2), U.S. Joint Forces Command, Norfolk, VA.

On selection to flag rank, Rear Admiral (ret) LeVitre assumed the position as Director for Intelligence (J2), U.S. Pacific Command, Honolulu, Hawaii. From 2000 to late 2003, she oversaw intelligence operations at a time of increased tensions, from the EP-3 aircraft incident with China, to the Global War on Terrorism, and crises involving India-Pakistan and Korea. She conceived of and oversaw implementation of an expanded information sharing architecture, involving traditional allied partners, non-traditional alliances and non-DOD entities to include the FBI, state and local authorities. [2]

Please re-read that last sentence again.

She conceived of and oversaw implementation of an expanded information sharing architecture, involving traditional allied partners, non-traditional alliances and non-DOD entities to include the FBI, state and local authorities.

Of the Asymmetric Threat Division (DO5), the Defense Inspector General for Intelligence wrote this:

In 1999, the Joint Forces Intelligence Command created the Asymmetric Threat Division to take a non-traditional approach to analysis. The Asymmetric Threat Division provided current intelligence briefings and produced the Worldwide Terrorist Threat Summary in support of the Intelligence Director for the United States Joint Forces Command. The Asymmetric Threat Division also provided support to the Joint Task Force-Civil Support. The Joint Task Force-Civil Support assisted civil authorities with disaster assistance. [3]

IRON MAN pretty much alludes to the fact that DO5 was ahead of its time:

(U) The Asymmetric Threat Branch in JFIC was a forerunner of current all-source fusion centers. Unlike other analytical offices in the intelligence cornmunity, DO5 members had
a wide mix of skilis in all six intelligence disciplines - HUMINT, OSINT, COMINT, ELINT, IMINT, and MASINT. Consequently, DO5 was able to develop and use all-source, original analysis in a manner probably then unprecedented within the intelligence community. [1]

The Asymmetric Threat Division was Rear Admiral LeVitre's baby, making her truly a visionary in the intelligence community. But according to IRON MAN, shortly after LeVitre left, her replacement shut down DO5.

(U) [redacted] the last JFIC commanding officer under which I served, was adamantly opposed to JFIC conducting any original analysis of al-Qa'ida, and directed such work be stopped in late 2000-early 2001. [1]

And that action - actively shutting down DO5 - puts a very different spin on things.

Someone please tell me that DO5 wasn't shut down because of sexism and that as a direct result, 2,753 people died on 9/11 just because the boys club didn't take girls.

Because if that's the case, that's some seriously [redacted] up [redacted].

ADDENDUM

Flag officer announcements from the archives of the Department of Defense.

Flag Officer Assignments
U.S. Department of Defense, Press Release, December 8, 2003

WASHINGTON (NNS) -- Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Vern Clark announced the following flag officer assignments Dec. 8:

Rear Adm. (lower half) Rosanne M. Levitre is being assigned as director, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, FORCEnet, N6/N7, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Arlington, Va. Levitre is currently serving as director for intelligence, J2, U.S. Pacific Command, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.

Flag Officer Announcements
U.S. Department of Defense, Press Release, May 25, 2000

Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen announced today that the President has
nominated the following U.S. Navy officers for promotion to rear admiral (lower half):

SPECIAL DUTY OFFICER (INTELLIGENCE)

Levitre, Rosanne M. Director of Intelligence, J2, [NL] U.S. Joint Forces Command AUG 1999 TO DATE Norfolk, Va.

Flag and General Officer Assignments
U.S. Department of Defense, Press Release, June 30, 2000

The following are flag and general officer assignments as announced by the Departments of the Navy and Army.

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT
Levitre, Rosanne M.
Rear Admiral
(Lower Half) (Selectee)
Director of Intelligence
J2, U.S. Joint Forces Command
Norfolk, Va.

NEW ASSIGNMENT
Director for Intelligence
J2, U.S. Pacific Command
Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii

References

[1] Attachment - Unclassified FOIA Response PDF
April 8, 2011
Formal Complaint to DoD Inspector General
re: JFIC and Congressional Inquiry
May 8, 2006

[2] See: Members » Rear Admiral Rosanne M. LeVitre
The Consensus for American Security

[3] Review of Joint Forces Intelligence Command Response to 9/11 Commission PDF
Deputy Inspector General for Intelligence
United States Department of Defense
September 23, 2008
Declassified March 5, 2010
From the Federation of American Scientists

Report: Intelligence Unit Told Before 9/11 to Stop Tracking Bin Laden
By Jeffrey Kaye, Truthout, May 23, 2011

Abbreviations - used above

COMINT - Communications Intelligence
DO5 - Asymmetric Threat Division
DOD - Department of Defense
ELINT - Electronic Intelligence
FBI - Federal Bureau of Investigation
HUMINT- Intelligence
IMINT- Imagery Intelligence
J2 - Director for Intelligence
JCS - Joint Chiefs of Staff
JFCOM - Joint Forces Command
JFIC - Joint Forces Intelligence Command
JIC - Joint Intelligence Center
JTF-CS - Joint Task Force- Civil Support
MASINT- Measurement and Signature Intelligence
OSINT- Open Source Intelligence
PACOM - Pacific Command
RADM - Rear Admiral
US - United States of America
USN - United States Navy

What did Kirk see?

More thinking out loud.....and nit picking.

In November 1999, Captain Kirk von Ackermann, USAF, arrived to work at Joint Forces Intelligence Command in Virginia, where he was assigned to counter terrorism.

In trying to describe her husband and how his work was slowly consuming his entire life, Megan von Ackermann wrote a very short passage that took place somewhere in the vicinity of Virginia:

Dual Lives
By Megan von Ackermann, Missing in Iraq, September 5, 2006

Like the time [Kirk] glanced over as we passed a local bank, stiffened and muttered something about 'so they use that one...' I think he had recognized someone going into the bank, and now part of him was concerned with working out how to use this unexpected windfall of information.

Assuming what was written is accurate, it means JFIC more or less lied, at least once, in its response to the Deputy Inspector General for Intelligence.

Appendix B. (U) Scanned JFIC Response:

2. Did your agency have information prior to Sept 11, 2001, to suggest that international terrorist cells were operating within the United States? If so, please set this information aside for review by the staff of the Joint inquiry.

ANSWER: No, but prior to Sept 11, 2001, neither JFIC nor JFCOM tracked terrorist activity in the United States. The United States was not part of JFCOM's AOR.

Then why was a JFIC counter terrorism officer so interested in someone he saw outside of a bank? Why did that officer refer to 'they' - plural - unless the subject observed was connected to or a member of an already known group that - at best - was only 'suspected' of ties to terrorists?

What did Kirk see and who exactly did he pass that information on to? More importantly, what did the recipient do with it?

References

Attachment - Unclassified FOIA Response PDF
FOIA response
April 8, 2011
Formal Complaint to DoD Inspector General
re: JFIC and Congressional Inquiry
May 8, 2006

Review of Joint Forces Intelligence Command Response to 9/11 Commission PDF
Deputy Inspector General for Intelligence
United States Department of Defense
September 23, 2008
Declassified March 5, 2010
From the Federation of American Scientists

Report: Intelligence Unit Told Before 9/11 to Stop Tracking Bin Laden
By Jeffrey Kaye, Truthout, May 23, 2011

Kidnapped

Heads up.

Colin Freeman, who first wrote about the disappearance of Kirk von Ackermann, has a new book coming out on his own kidnapping in Somalia. Today, Freeman is chief foreign correspondent on The Sunday Telegraph.

Description from the publisher.

Kidnapped: Life As A Somali Pirate Hostage
By Colin Freeman, Monday Books, June 2011

Somalia: the world’s most notorious failed state, and one of the most dangerous places on earth.

It’s a land of pirates, criminal gangs and militant Islamists, which even the military might of the U.S.A. couldn’t tame. With no government for two decades, there can be few worse places to be taken hostage...

This is Sunday Telegraph foreign correspondent Colin Freeman’s account of being kidnapped on the lawless Somali pirate coast - and how it became a haven for modern-day buccaneers.

There's also a short piece by Colin Freeman at the BBC.

Somalia: What is it like to be kidnapped?
By Colin Freeman, BBC, June 29, 2011

The Missing Man in 2D

Gosh - for a long time, I've wanted a hard copy of the Missing Man for reading and reference offline. After some research, I finally settled on a primitive PDF format as it allows the embedded links to remain active. It's not perfect but it works. The least I can do is share it with anyone who wants a copy. (I plan to update Volume 4 some point in the future) 

The Missing Man blog posts are divided into 5 separate volumes. They are available for download (free) through Google docs.

Volume 1 - Introduction, Overview, Index, Bibliography

Volume 2 - November 12, 2003 - May 13, 2008

Volume 3 - May 25, 2008 - March 28, 2010

Volume 4 - March 31, 2010 - June 13, 2011

Volume 5 - Appendix

Download Directions

To download or print each volume, after following the link, just click on 'File' in the upper left hand corner. See insert below.

Asymmetric Threat Division - opposition

Review of Joint Forces Intelligence Command Response to 9/11 Commission PDF
Deputy Inspector General for Intelligence
United States Department of Defense
September 23, 2008
Declassified March 5, 2010
From the Federation of American Scientists

(U) JFIC's Asymmetric Threat Division (DO5)

(U) In 1999, the [Joint Forces Intelligence Command]created the Asymmetric Threat Division (DO5) to take a non-traditional approach to analysis. The Director of Operations recruited JFIC personnel from the command based upon their counterintelligence and counterterrorism expertise. The DO5 provided current intelligence briefings and produced the Worldwide Terrorist Threat Summary in support of the USJFCOM Intelligence staff. The DO5 also provided support to the Joint Task Force-Civil Support (JTF-CS). The JTF-CS assisted civil authorities with disaster assistance. The DO5 supported the JTF-CS exercises by establishing fictional terrorist organizations that would mimic real world terrorist groups.

Reviewing Jeffrey Kaye and Jason Leopold's two recent articles over at Truth Out and the related documents. Thinking a bit out loud here and feeling my way around it all.

Anyway, what I am trying to understand is this: why were commanding officers so opposed to the Asymmetric Threat Division's intelligence analysis regarding al Qaeda? Just what the heck was going on over there - was it a Navy thing or was there more to it than that?

Principals

Pieced together from various sources, a very rough list of 'principals' from the 2000-2001 time period. Keep in mind there's some overlap with people coming and going, promotions, etc. Some of the titles might be wrong (my error) and there's a bunch of unknowns. At least it's a starting point.

Admiral Harold W. Gehman, Jr. served as Commander In Chief U.S. Joint Forces Command from September 1997 until his retirement September 2000. His replacement was General Kernan.

Lieutenant General Thomas N. Burnette, Jr. served as Deputy Commander In Chief U.S. Joint Forces Command from July 1999 until his retirement September 2000. His replacement was Vice Admiral Mayer.

• General William F. Kernan, US Army - Commander in Chief, US Joint Forces Command
• Vice Admiral Martin J. Mayer, USN - Deputy Commander in Chief, US JFCOM
• Major General Jack R. Holbein Jr., USAF - Chief of Staff, US JFCOM
• Colonel Daniel P. Bolger, US Army - Director, Strategy and Analysis, US JFCOM
• [unknown] - Director of Operations, US JFCOM
• [unknown] - Deputy Director of Operations, US JFCOM
• Vice Admiral Robert B. Murrett, USN - Director for Intelligence, US JFCOM
• [unknown] - Deputy Director for Intelligence, US JFCOM
• [unknown] - Director for Intelligence Operations, US JFCOM
• [unknown] - Deputy Director for Intelligence Operations, US JFCOM
• Captain Janice M. Dundas, USN - Commander in Chief, Joint Forces Intelligence Command
• [unknown] - Deputy Commander in Chief,  JFIC
• [unknown] - Director of Operations, JFIC
• [unknown] - Deputy Director of Operations, JFIC
• Major Oliver Wright III, US Army - Division Head, Asymmetric Threat Division, JFIC
• John Rodriguez, NCIS - Deputy Division Head, Asymmetric Threat Division, JFIC
• Captain Stephen F. Santez Jr., USN - [title unknown], Asymmetric Threat Division, JFIC
• Captain Kirk von Ackermann, USAF - Deputy, Asymmetric Threat Division, JFIC
• [unknown] - Operations Officer, Asymmetric Threat Division, JFIC
• [unknown] - Counterintelligence Security Officer, US JFCOM
• Major General Bruce M. Lawlor, US Army - Commander, Joint Task Force - Civil Support 
• [unknown] - Deputy Commander, JTF-CS
• [unknown] - Chief of Staff, JTF-CS

Just from a history standpoint, 2000 - 2001 is a fascinating period for the US military and in particular, Joint Forces Command: it's all about transformation. Commander in Chief (CINC), General William F. Kernan, created a new directorate tasking a team, Mayer, Holbein and Bolger, to manage transformation strategy for JFCOM.

The CINC's charter to this team was simple: infuse joint forces with new ideas, and change the way JFCOM will fight. [...]

Rigorous simulation and gaming must be pursued in response to new or emerging technologies and concepts. [1]

Infuse joint forces with new ideas and rigorous simulations....only, not so much.

Oddly enough, Kernan was worried about procuring laser-guided missiles to replenish what was lost during Kosovo, essentially bringing missiles to a knife fight. Meanwhile, a new subordinate organization - the Joint Task Force-Civil Support - was tasked to "serve as the U.S. Joint Forces Command lead for WMD events in the United States"[2]. To prepare, JTF-CS was conducting quarterly training exercises (simulations) based on chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high yield explosives incidents. The Navy - who held the purse strings - wasn't so hot about sponsoring Joint Forces Command. [3]

From Jeffrey Kaye's source materials, IRON MAN on page 2 of his Formal Complaint to DoD Inspector General [4] writes:

[The Asymmetric Threat Division] DO5 began preparing a wide range of original analysis on asymmetric warfare, especially terrorism, from mid-1998 until mid-2001. This analysis included: [...]

(U) Reports on the most likely targets for domestic and international terrorists both within the US and abroad, as well as adjunct targets during a traditional war. The most sensitive of these reports were those identifying targets within the US, developing scenarios, analysis of commonalities for use in planning responses and recommendations for preventative action. This US tasking was given by JTF-CS.

JTF-CS was clearly asking DO5 to help prepare realistic scenarios for its training exercises which meshes with what Megan von Ackermann has written [5] about her husband, that Captain Kirk von Ackermann was involved with designing 'readiness exercises'. In a statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Major General Bruce M. Lawlor, the first Commander of Joint Task Force - Civil Support (JTF-CS) provided some details about JTF-CS. [6]

In addition to planning for real world events, JTF-CS conducts quarterly training exercises that focus on planning and deployment for specific types of CBRNE incidents. To date we have conducted such exercises in each of the 5 areas with which we are concerned: chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and high yield explosive events. We have learned to create a base plan for the most dangerous event and prepare branches and sequels for other possible incidents. By doing so, we have reduced our response planning time considerably.

Planning for real world events...against real adversaries, like Al Qaeda. Lawlor casually mentions in his statement that one such exercise was quietly conducted live during the Presidential inauguration of George W. Bush.

The work of the Asymmetric Threat Division - and Captain Kirk von Ackermann - starts coming into focus and becomes much more tangible. These guys aren't sitting around playing video games, they're playing for real. The intelligence is real. The enemy is real. The targets - real. The scenarios - real. The maps - real. The threat - real.

So, why were they getting shut down orders? Who didn't want them trained and ready to fight the bad guys?

Again, from Jeffrey Kaye's source materials, IRON MAN states on page 5 of his Formal Complaint to DoD Inspector General [7]:

[U] [redacted] the last JFIC commanding officer under which I served adamantly opposed JFIC conducting any original analysis of al-Qa'ida, and directed work be stopped in late 2000 - early 2001, and enforced that order upon my departure.

Review of Joint Forces Intelligence Command Response to 9/11 Commission, Appendix C - a March 25, 2002 letter attached to the FOIA response signed by Major John A. Robinson, USAF, [8] clearly identifies Captain Janice M. Dundas, US Navy, as Commander of the JFIC. Back in March 2000, Dundas signed Captain Kirk von Ackermann's letter of appreciation.

In the section marked, JFIC Response to Congress [9], page 14, the Inspector General states:

(U) The JFIC's Commanding Officer established a command atmosphere which highlighted intelligence oversight and mission focus. The DO5 Operations Officer stated that the JFIC was very cautious over the support that was provided to the JTF-CS based on intelligence oversight guidelines. The Deputy Director of Intelligence stated that JFIC Commanding Officer would repeatedly ask for written certification to justify any tasking to any department or division. He further stated that DO5 had no theater specific mission. The subsequent Deputy Director of Intelligence directed him to stop tracking Usama Bin Laden. The Commanding Officer stated that the tracking of Usama Bin Laden did not fall in JFIC's mission. The Commanding Officer also stated that a couple of folks doing analysis of Afghanistan terrorist training camps was perceived as excess capability when it's not your AOR [Area of Operations] and that the issues were not in JFIC's swim lane.

Someone needs to ask Dundas what she was afraid of - whose toesies were getting stepped on. Was it coming from above her? Did she personally object to Major General Bruce M. Lawlor, Commander of JTF-CS? Petty, yes, but not unheard of.

Vice Admiral Martin J. Mayer, also Navy, was the Deputy Commander in Chief. Prior to serving as DCINC, Mayer was Director for Strategy Requirements and Integration at JFCOM and part of Kernan's 'team' to manage transformation strategy for JFCOM.

IRON MAN notes in his Formal Complaint that "...senior JFCOM staff including the DCINC and J3" were present at the first Asymmetric Threat Division briefing titled, "The WMD Threat to the US."[10] After the briefing, it had been noted that the national military terrorism exercise committment for FY01 involved a cruise ship.

A few months later, Mayer was nominated for appointment to Vice Admiral and Deputy Commander of US Joint Forces on September 15, 2000. Within a month, on October 12, 2000, the USS Cole was the victim of a suicide bombing in Yemen. 17 sailors died that day. By December, CNN was reporting that Al Qaeda was responsible. [11]

In the Afterword to the book Touching History: The Untold Story of the Drama That Unfolded in the Skies Over America on 9/11, Major General (retired) Larry Arnold 1st Air Force and the Continental US North American Air Defense Command Region wrote:

Just two weeks before September 11, 2001, I had met with Vice Admiral Martin Mayer, the deputy commander in chief of Joint Forces Command located in Norfolk, Virginia. He had informed me that he intended to kill all funding for a plan my command had been working on for two years, that would defend against a cruise missile attack by terrorists. While I convinced Admiral Mayer to continue his funding support, he told me in front of my chief of staff, Colonel Alan Scott; Navy Captain David Stewart, the lead on the project; and my executive officer, Lt. Col. Kelley Duckett, that our concern about Osama bin Laden as a possible threat to America was unfounded and that, to repeat, ‘If everyone would just turn off CNN, there wouldn’t be a threat from Osama bin Laden.’ [12]

Mayer's myopic thinking was far from unique. His Commander in Chief, General Kernan, was interviewed for an article shortly after the Cole bombing [13]:

The way the United States deploys its ships and troops overseas, as well as how they are based at home, will be forever changed because of the attack on the destroyer Cole, according to the man responsible for providing forces to America's combat commanders. [...]

The Cole, a $1 billion Arleigh Burke-class destroyer, was attacked Oct. 12 while it refueled in the southern Arabian port of Aden, Yemen. Seventeen sailors from the Norfolk-based ship died and 42 others were injured.

"I don't think anybody could have predicted somebody would come floating up there on a commercially made skiff that had an embedded shape charge in it, come right up against the side of a ship and blow a 40-by-40-foot hole in it," [Kernan] said. "It's incredible they were able to achieve it."

It's not that big of a jump in the imagination from commercial skiff to commercial jet. Within a year, hijackers on a suicide mission would hit the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.

It's like the commanders just couldn't face up to a very real war. They couldn't - or wouldn't - see the elephant in the room - asymmetric threats from groups like Al Qaeda.

It's all so.....disappointing.

References

New Documents Claim Intelligence on Bin Laden, al-Qaeda Targets Withheld From Congress' 9/11 Probe
By Jeffrey Kaye and Jason Leopold, Truthout, June 13, 2011

Attachment - Unclassified FOIA Response PDF - includes:
FOIA response
April 8, 2011
Formal Complaint to DoD Inspector General
re: JFIC and Congressional Inquiry
May 8, 2006

Report: Intelligence Unit Told Before 9/11 to Stop Tracking Bin Laden
By Jeffrey Kaye, Truthout, May 23, 2011

Review of Joint Forces Intelligence Command Response to 9/11 Commission PDF
Deputy Inspector General for Intelligence
United States Department of Defense
September 23, 2008
Declassified March 5, 2010
From the Federation of American Scientists

[1] A Study of Joint Transformation at United States Joint Forces Command
By Colonel Lorraine E. Tyacke, United States Army, April 9, 2002

[2] Management of National Guard, Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Teams
Office of the Inspector General, Department of Defense
Audit Report No. D-2001-043
See: Coordination With Other Organizations
January 31, 2001

[3] Tyacke, page 8

[4] Attachment - Unclassified FOIA Response PDF - includes:
FOIA response
April 8, 2011
Formal Complaint to DoD Inspector General
re: JFIC and Congressional Inquiry
May 8, 2006

[5] Getting to Iraq part two: Counter Terrorism
By Megan von Ackermann, Missing in Iraq, March 24, 2006

[6] Statement of Major General Bruce M. Lawlor PDF
US Army, Commander, Joint Task Force-Civil Support,
US Joint Forces Command
Before the Senate Armed Services Committee on Status
Update of JTF-CS
May 1, 2001

[7] Unclassified FOIA Response, page 5

[8] Review of Joint Forces Intelligence Command Response to 9/11 Commission
Deputy Inspector General for Intelligence
United States Department of Defense
September 23, 2008
Declassified March 5, 2010

[9] Ibid, page 14

[10]Unclassified FOIA Response, page 3

[11] USS Cole plot began after embassy attacks, investigator says
David Ensor, Chris Plante and Peter Bergen, CNN, December 20, 2000

[12] Touching History: The Untold Story of the Drama That Unfolded in the Skies Over America on 9/11, By Lynn Spencer, Free Press, June 3, 2008
Afterword, page 285-291, by Major General (retired) Larry Arnold 1st Air Force and the Continental US North American Air Defense Command Region at Tyndall Air Force base near Panama City, FL.

[13] Cole Alters Military's Perception of Security; Joint Forces Chief Assesses Challenges at Overseas Posts, By Jack Dorsey, The Virginian-Pilot (archive $) January 28, 2001

Additional Reading

Military Support of Civil Authorities—
A New Focus for a New Millennium
Major General Bruce M. Lawlor
, Commander, 
Joint Task Force–Civil Support
October 2000 (Updated September 2001)

Report of the Joint Inquiry into the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001 PDF - By the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (declassified version)
S. REPT. NO. 107- 351 and H. REPT. NO. 107-792
December 20, 2002

9-11 Commission Report
The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
July 22, 2004

9/11 Commission - Appendix C - Hearings - witnesses, etc

Notes

Admiral Harold W. Gehman, Jr. served as Commander In Chief U.S. Joint Forces Command from September 1997 until his retirement September 2000

Vice Admiral Robert B. Murrett, USN served as the director for Intelligence, US Joint Forces Command, from August 10, 2000 through January 25, 2002

Truthout - Intelligence Withheld From Congress

PS. I just want to take a moment to publicly thank all of the contractors, as well as the military, intelligence, and private military personnel who have graciously shared their knowledge and experience with me over the years. Their information has helped me to better understand the incredibly complex world that men (and women) like Kirk von Ackermann work in. 

While working for Ultra Services of Istanbul Turkey, an American contractor and former intelligence officer, Kirk von Ackermann, disappeared on an isolated road in Iraq on October 9, 2003. He remains the longest missing American in Iraq today.

This blog is loaded with over 7 years of research about the incident as well as the murder of his colleague, Ryan Manelick, who died in December 2003. My own personal belief is that von Ackermann was killed because he was mistaken for John Dawkins who was for all intents and purposes part owner of Ultra Services.

At one point, I discussed the case with one of Kirk von Ackermann's former colleagues and shared my thoughts but for some reason, the scenario I outlined seemed like too much of a stretch. Which is a kind of twisted irony - even in death - Kirk von Ackermann just remains too far outside the socially acceptable, just like the scenarios he once imagined as an intelligence officer.

Truthout

Jeffrey Kaye continues lifting the veil on 9-11 intelligence failures with a new article at Truthout. The end of the article reviews some of what is known in public about Kirk von Ackermann.

I should probably just go on record and reveal that I first learned of the Asymmetric Threat Division - by name - back in 2005. I was under the impression the name of the group was classified and thus never revealed it. I was also once told that Kirk von Ackermann was possibly one of the finest intelligence officers to work for the DoD in the last century. He was said to have had an incredible talent for connecting seemingly unrelated details. I was told his work saved lives - literally.

Insert of the last page of documents from an Unclassified FOIA Response included with the article at Truthout, EXCLUSIVE: New Documents Claim Intelligence on Bin Laden, al-Qaeda Targets Withheld From Congress' 9/11 Probe by Jeffrey Kaye and Jason Leopold, June 13, 2011.

The Unclassified FOIA Response attached to the Truthout article is an absolute must read. The FOIA Response was the result of a 2006 complaint to the DoD Inspector General filed by a former intelligence officer known only as IRONMAN.

EXCLUSIVE: New Documents Claim Intelligence on Bin Laden, al-Qaeda Targets Withheld From Congress' 9/11 Probe
By Jeffrey Kaye and Jason Leopold, Truthout, June 13, 2011
Attachment - Unclassified FOIA Response 

The last page of the FOIA Response - which quotes IRONMAN - holds particular interest for this blog.

(U) [unclassified] My motivation for this complaint is multi-faceted. I do believe that knowledge of the work done by DO5 would add to DoD's understanding of its role in the events leading up to 9/11 and how to avoid future attacks. For this reason, and other more personal reasons, I believe that DO5's analysis, especially the target analysis, should be reviewed and, if possible, declassified. I have been falsely accused of revealing classified information on DO5's work, when I am certain that that information is not and has not been classified since 9/11, and I do want to see myself cleared of that false accusation. In addition, I and the deputy of that team, [redacted] especially carried the burden of knowledge of how close DoD came to bin Laden and perhaps being able to reduce the number of lives lost on 9/11. I do not want that burden any longer. [redacted] [redacted] and I discussed this issue the last time we spoke. He remains the longest missing man in Iraq in this war, and I want, one day, to be able to explain to his children what their father foresaw.

The former deputy of the Asymmetric Threat Division and the longest missing man in Iraq is Kirk von Ackermann. The complicated and contentious history of the company he worked for in Iraq, Ultra Services, was featured in a 2006 article at ePluribus Media.

One Missing, One Dead: An Iraq Contractor in the Fog of War
By Susie Dow, ePluribus Media, May 12, 2006

The US Army CID did the best investigation they could with the information available to them. But they were horribly lead astray by working with the assumption that Kirk von Ackermann disappeared from where his vehicle was found. Von Ackermann's military experience - especially as detailed in the Unclassified FOIA Response - makes clear the events of that day were well outside his norm of behavior.

NSA audio recordings

On October 8, 2003, the day before he disappeared, Kirk von Ackermann called his wife in the United States from Iraq. He left a short message on their home answering machine.

The following day, October 9, just minutes before he 'disappeared', von Ackermann using his satellite phone reportedly called the cell phone of an Iraqi employee and requested help with a bad tire. Several minutes later, a passing patrol reported an abandoned vehicle just several miles down the road from a manned checkpoint. The Iraqi employee arrived approximately 45 minutes later.

It is my belief that an impostor placed that satellite call to the Iraqi employee - who due to limited language skills with English would be unable to tell the difference between two English speaking men's voices.

NSA has audio files of satellite phone calls originating in Iraq during this time period and is in a position to facilitate an analysis to see if in fact the male who placed the call to the Iraqi employee was Kirk von Ackermann. It defies any and all logic that Kirk von Ackermann deliberately drove alone with a bad tire - and without a translator - on a journey of over 165 miles through Iraq, with 7 of those miles on an isolated ridge he had previously identified as the most dangerous part of the journey between Tikrit and Kirkuk.

Perhaps investigators will finally get around to treating the disappearance of Kirk von Ackermann as the unsolved murder that it is.

Additional Reading

DoD Whistleblower: Documents Show Intel Withheld from 9/11 Congressional Investigators - author discussion and commentary of the Truthout article
By Jeff Kaye, FireDogLake, June 13, 2011

Report: Intelligence Unit Told Before 9/11 to Stop Tracking Bin Laden

By Jeffrey Kaye, Truthout, May 23, 2011

DoD Inspector General: Intel Agency Ordered to Stop Pre-9/11 Tracking of Bin Laden - author discussion and commentary of the Truthout article

By Jeff Kaye, FireDogLake, May 24, 2011

Review of Joint Forces Intelligence Command Response to 9/11 Commission PDF

Deputy Inspector General for Intelligence

Department of Defense

September 23, 2008

Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities before and after the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001
Report of the joint inquiry motivated IRON MAN's formal complaint, that JFIC withheld intelligence from congress
S. Rept. 107-351 and H. Rept. 107-792
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
U.S. Government Printing Office
December 2002

Counter Terrorism and JFIC

By Susie Dow, Missing Man, May 6, 2011

Counter Terrorism and Kirk von Ackermann

By Susie Dow, Missing Man, October 8, 2006

And because no one clicks on links anymore....

Getting to Iraq part two: Counter Terrorism

By Megan von Ackermann, Missing in Iraq, March 24, 2006

After Y2K, Kirk became more and more consumed by the counter-terrorism world. He was read into higher and higher clearances, learned more and more about the largest threats to the US and her allies. Specifically he became deeply aware of Osama Bin Ladin and his organization.

Kirk was involved with designing readiness excercises - scenarios to be used by various units as they tested their skills. He proposed that a small boat filled with explosives be used as a weapon against a large warship - and was told it was an unrealistic idea. This was, of course, well prior to the USS Cole attack.

He also, along with his team, not only suggested that a commercial jet could be used as a terrorist weapon, but predicted the most likely targets that would be chosen. Again, he was ignored, and sometimes laughed at.

Dual Lives
By Megan von Ackermann, Missing in Iraq, September 5, 2006

One afternoon we were driving up the highway outside of Langley. I was reading a magazine - the Smithsonian I think - and I was chatting to Kirk about an article discussing the greatest achievement of modern medicine: the successful campaign against smallpox. Wasn't it amazing, I said, the way the WHO had managed it, wasn't it wonderful that the world was safe now from a disease that had been a deadly threat for thousands of years. Very quietly, his hands stiff on the wheel, he said 'it's not gone.'

Just that. But I knew - I knew that not only did he know that more than one country had kept live samples of the virus, he knew intimately the infection rate, the symptoms, the horrific scarring that those lucky enough to survive would suffer. He knew how it could be weaponized, had thought about delivery systems, had worked through countless scenarios in which various populations were targeted and infected.

And gradually I realized that he was living like that constantly. Everywhere we went, there was part of him looking around and evaluating targets, thinking about blast zones, considering mortality rates, political value, public reaction.

Now tell me that same man, Kirk von Ackermann, chose to deliberately drive alone in an SUV with a bad tire over 165 miles without a translator most of it through Saddam Hussein's tribal area. Didn't happen.....

Truthout - Unasked Questions

It's a strange feeling to come across an article that mentions yourself.

Jeffrey Kaye of Truthout has written a detailed overview of the recent report from the Deputy Inspector General for Intelligence of the Department of Defense, Report: Intelligence Unit Told Before 9/11 to Stop Tracking Bin Laden. The report stems from a whistleblower complaint that alleged that "...the Joint Forces Intelligence Command had not disclosed all material to the 9/11 Commission." It is very fortunate that Jeffrey Kaye took an active interest in the report as my interest was not so much its findings rather I was much more interested in learning about the work of Capt. Kirk von Ackermann USAF at Joint Forces Intelligence Command (JFIC).

At the end of Kaye's article he quotes a statement I made here on this blog:

Dow noted the [Inspector General] report's conclusion: "The analysis completed by the Joint Forces Intelligence Command, specifically the Asymmetric Threat Division, was not applicable to the questions asked by the 9/11 Commission."

"Which leads me to believe the 9/11 Commission did not ask the correct questions," Dow said.

Question

Now, I fully admit, I have a bias. I see things as they relate to what I have learned of Kirk von Ackermann. So, one 'correct question' that immediately jumps to my mind - a question that the 9/11 Commission apparently did not ask the Asymmetric Threat Division - is this:

Did the Asymmetric Threat Division at any time prepare readiness excercises that involved the use of commercial aircraft as weapons? If yes: a. what were the predicted targets and b. who was that information disseminated to?

Because 'readiness exercises' were one of the things that Kirk von Ackermann was doing while at the Joint Forces Intelligence Command. And yes. Commercial aircraft used as weapons by flying them fully fueled in to buildings - like the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and the White House - was one of the scenarios that he predicted.

Cold Case File

For the past 7+ years, I've been researching and writing about the disappearance of Kirk von Ackermann as well as the murder of his colleague Ryan Manelick. I remain dis-satisfied with CID findings to date, first and foremost starting with the assumption that Kirk von Ackermann actually disappeared from where his vehicle was found. To arrive at such a conclusion - as tempting as it may be - requires suspending all logic. (See: The Bridge Theory and Missing Contractor: Military Mechanics May Hold the Keys)

I'd just like to see CID re-open the case and look at all of the evidence in chronological order with fresh eyes. Suspect everyone, spare no one from investigation - including the military personnel who first reported finding his abandoned vehicle.

References

Report: Intelligence Unit Told Before 9/11 to Stop Tracking Bin Laden
By Jeffrey Kaye, Truthout, May 23, 2011

DoD Inspector General: Intel Agency Ordered to Stop Pre-9/11 Tracking of Bin Laden - author discussion and commentary of the Truthout article
By Jeff Kaye, FireDogLake, May 24, 2011

Review of Joint Forces Intelligence Command Response to 9/11 Commission PDF
Deputy Inspector General for Intelligence
Department of Defense
September 23, 2008

Counter Terrorism and JFIC
By Susie Dow, Missing Man, May 6, 2011

Counter Terrorism and Kirk von Ackermann
By Susie Dow, Missing Man, October 8, 2006

Getting to Iraq part two: Counter Terrorism
By Megan von Ackermann, Missing in Iraq, March 24, 2006

After Y2K, Kirk became more and more consumed by the counter-terrorism world. He was read into higher and higher clearances, learned more and more about the largest threats to the US and her allies. Specifically he became deeply aware of Osama Bin Ladin and his organization.

Kirk was involved with designing readiness excercises - scenarios to be used by various units as they tested their skills. He proposed that a small boat filled with explosives be used as a weapon against a large warship - and was told it was an unrealistic idea. This was, of course, well prior to the USS Cole attack.

He also, along with his team, not only suggested that a commercial jet could be used as a terrorist weapon, but predicted the most likely targets that would be chosen. Again, he was ignored, and sometimes laughed at.

Dead Contractors

For those who follow issues regarding overseas contractors, there's a new in-depth report on casualties and contingency contracting just published. A draft is available for reading. For the initiated, it's mostly familiar territory.

Dead Contractors (click the download link for PDF)
The Unexamined Effect of Surrogates on the Public's Casualty Sensitivity
By Steven L. Schooner & Colin D. Swan
Journal of National Security Law & Policy, forthcoming 2011

It's nice to see casualty data and a request for an honest debate on the role of contractors in US military operations all in one place. But given politics at home over the last ten years, an open and honest debate is unlikely to occur.

There's only a passing mention to missing personnel in some footnotes.

Defense Base Act Case Summary - page 48

My cynicism says nothing will change until the oxes are gored of those who wage war from behind their desk chairs .

Counter Terrorism and JFIC

I stumbled upon a fascinating report today, Review of Joint Forces Intelligence Command Response to 9/11 Commission.

According to Secrecy News Volume 2010 Issue No. 18 of March 9, 2010, the review was only recently declassified. Also see this March 5, 2010 cover letter to the original November 4, 2008 FOIA request from the Department of Defense Inspector General.

Page 9 - Objective

(U) The objective was to determine whether the JFIC [Joint Forces Intelligence Command]  misled Congress by willfully withholding operational information in response to the 9/11 Commission.

The review notes and confirms that JFIC was never identified in the 9/11 Commission Report.

At first glance, it might seem that this review has little relationship to this blog. But there, smack dab in the middle of the review, are members of the Joint Forces Intelligence Command that former USAF Capt. Kirk von Ackermann once associated with.

So with all of the news coverage about the death of Osama bin Laden, I thought now would be a good time to look at what is known about von Ackermann's previous work in counter terrorism while serving in the US Air Force.  While a general overview of anecdotes can be found here: Counter Terrorism and Kirk von Ackermann, what I'm after are the specifics - who, what, when.

So let's start with the photos and try to peel this apart.

Capt. Kirk von Ackermann received a Joint Forces Intelligence Command (JFIC) Commendation Medal from CAPT Santez on April 26, 2000. Two personnel, the Head and Deputy Head of the Asymmetric Threat Division at JFIC during this same time period (Spring 2000), are identified on page 18 of the review. Additional personnel are also identified within the review, but it's not clear they were with JFIC during the specified time period.

Capt. Kirk von Ackermann also received a Certificate of Appreciation from CAPT J. M. Dundas, US Navy of the JFIC on March 20, 2000. 'CAPT Janice Dundas USN' is identified by name as the commander of the JFIC on page 20 of the review.

Excerpts from the Review of Joint Force Intelligence Command Response to 9/11 Commission are quoted below. I've highlighted additional details of interest. It's not much, but it gives just a little more insight into the world of counter terrorism that Kirk von Ackermann was once working within.

Review of Joint Forces Intelligence Command Response to 9/11 Commission
Report No. 2008-INTEL-15
Inspector General United States Department of Defense
September 23, 2008

Page 5 - Executive Summary - Background

(U) The Joint Forces Intelligence Command was established in 1999 and was subordinate to the United States Joint Forces Command. The mission of the Joint Forces Intelligence Command was "to provide general and direct intelligence support to United States Joint Forces Command, United States Joint Forces Command staff directorates, subordinate unified commands, joint task forces, Service component commands and subordinate joint forces commands tasked with executing United States Forces Command geographic or functional missions." In 1999, the Joint Forces Intelligence Command created the Asymmetric Threat Division to take a non-traditional approach to analysis. The Asymmetric Threat Division provided current intelligence briefings and produced Worlwide Terrorist Threat Summary in support of the Intelligence Director for the United States Joint Forces Command. The Asymmetric Threat Division also provided support to the Joint Task Force-Civil Support. The Joint Task Force-Civil Support assisted civil authorities with disaster assistance.

According to his wife's blog, Capt. von Ackermann headed up the Y2K task force - which places him at JFIC prior to January 2000 - as well as attended some White House intelligence briefings. She was under the impression he had analyzed the threat of the weaponization of small pox as well as proposed unorthodox methods of attacking United States interests. Small pox - a biological weapon - is an important detail.

Page 6

The analysis completed by the Joint Forces Intelligence Command, specifically the Asymmetric Threat Division, was not applicable to the questions asked by the 9/11 Commission.

Which leads me to believe the 9/11 Commission did not ask the correct questions. Anyway...back to the review.

Appendix B. (U) Scanned JFIC Response:

Page 17 - Request

Please provide a list of the officers within your agency that are principally responsible for counter-terrorism activities on a day-to-day basis and identify the heads and deputy heads of these offices and their dates of service from 1995 to present. (Note: we are not asking for everyone in supervisory chain of such officials). If the individuals occupying these positions are current employees of your agency, please indicate this.

Page 18 - Response

Nov 1999-Summer 2001: Asymmetric Threat Division, Division Head MAJ Oliver Wright III (USA) still at JFIC, Deputy John Rodriguez (NCIS) now at DIA.

Von Ackermann was receiving accolades from the JFIC in the Spring of 2000. His participation on the Y2K task force makes clear he was already serving at JFIC at the very latest by December of 1999.

Appendix C. (U) Scanned USJFCOM Response:

Page 20

Subject: Congressional Inquiry into 11 September 2001 Terrorist Attack (U)

(U) JFIC did not track in-CONUS foreign threat or terrorist information prior to 11 Sep 01, so its answers to Mr. Snider's questions are mostly negative. The answers are attached to this email; they have been reviewed by CAPT Janice Dundas USN, JFIC Commander.

(signed)
Maj. John A. Robinson, USAF

As mentioned, CAPT J. M. Dundas signed a letter on JFIC letterhead dated March 20, 2000, attached to a Certificate of Appreciation issued to Capt. von Ackermann.

Page 30

Appended below are the Joint Force Intelligence Command's replies to the Congressional Inquiry questions tasked by VADM Wilson. JFIC POC is CDR Mike Villareal. JFIC ADJ. DSN 836-7168 JFCOM/J2 POC is Maj. John Robinson. JFCOM/J237, DSN 836-6006

It's unclear if any of the above three men served at JFIC during the same time as Capt. von Ackermann.

Page 31 - Question

What does your agency consider its marching orders both past (since 1985) and present, in terms of its responsibilities in the counter-terrorism arena, ie. what documents establish your requirements and priorities? Please identify these by title and set them aside for review by the staff of the joint inquiry.

Page 32 - Response

b. Fall 1999-Sep 11, 2001: Focus on Asymmetric Threats OCONUS to include terrorism and CBRN [Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear threats] issues. As Joint Force Provider, emphasis was on force protection for JFCOM Components and support to JTF-CS (Joint Task Force-Civil Support). JFCOM J2 and JTF-CS PIRs set the requirements.

And that's where it becomes crystal clear that Capt. von Ackermann - the counter terrorism officer - was assigned to the Asymmetric Threat Division cited earlier in the review. As 'Asymmetric Threats' included terrorism and biological threats - there's the link to the weaponization of small pox mentioned above.

Some statements from the JFCOM website from the Spring of 2000:

US Joint Forces Command
11: New Name, Future Focus

In October 1999, the name of Atlantic Command changed to United States Joint Forces Command to emphasize the command's role leading transformation of U.S. military forces

Still one of five geographic combatant unified commands, U.S. Joint Forces Command formally took on a more functional role with the new name. It is the only unified command with both a geographic area and functional responsibilities.

Joint Forces Command gained a functional mandate to lead transformation of U.S. military joint warfighting into the 21st Century. The command's geographical responsibility was modified to more closely align with existing NATO Allied Command Atlantic's (ACLANT) area of responsibility -- both a long history of cooperation with European Allies and recent history in Central Europe indicate future military operations will not only be joint, but also combined national efforts.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Vision 2020 [Ed note: this document was released May 20, 2000] projects that conflicts of the future will go to the side with the right technology, applied at the right time with the right warrior. Re-designation reflected the command's commitment to experimentation with new warfighting concepts and technologies that answer the call in the Joint Chiefs vision.

Concurrently the command was charged to answer another national call to support terrorist response operations in the continental U.S. Joint Forces Command created the first domestic Joint Task Force, JTF-Civil Support, to provide military assistance to civil authorities, like the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and FBI, for consequence management of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) incidents in the United States.

A news article from the time period describes the Joint Vision 2020 report mentioned above. Two paragraphs stand out.

Joint Vision 2020 Emphasizes Full-spectrum Dominance
By Jim Garamone, American Forces Press Service, June 2, 2000

Adversaries will probably not challenge U.S. strengths, but seek to attack the United States and its interests through "asymmetric means." They could identify vulnerable areas and devise means to attack them.

"The potential of such asymmetric approaches is perhaps the most serious danger the United States faces in the immediate future - - and this danger includes long-range ballistic missiles and other direct threats to U.S. citizens and territory," the report says. 

Prior to going to Iraq, counter terrorism was the world in which Kirk von Ackermann was immersed. How can anyone honestly think he then forgot all of his training and experience, jumped into an unfamiliar SUV in Iraq, drove 180 miles - much of it on an isolated road - alone - with a bad tire.

Such reasoning defies logic.

References

Review of Joint Forces Intelligence Command Response to 9/11 Commission PDF
Deputy Inspector General for Intelligence
Department of Defense
September 23, 2008

The Gossip Grapevine or the Anatomy of a Lie

Still wandering through the piles of my research files on the disappearance of Kirk von Ackermann and the murder of Ryan Manelick.

One of the topics I'd like to cover is email - specifically some background on the ultra-services.com email server. You know what small offices are like - everyone loves the water cooler gossip. Well, taking things a step further, there is a very good chance someone was intercepting and reading Ultra Services email. At a later date, I'll walk readers through all of the technical research that lays out the details and who I think was involved in the snooping but for now, I'm just going to provide a general overview.

Ultra Services had a website and used company email. The website was ultra-services.com and the company email addresses were john@ultra-services.com, ryan@ultra-services.com, charles@ultra-services.com, kirk@ultra-services.com, etc. It was a pretty basic set up.

The IP address for ultra-services.com was a co-located server in Turkey. Because of the domains associated within that specific block of addresses back in 2003, it's fairly easy to deduce that some if not all of the Turkish colleagues who were involved with Ultra Services had easy access to others emails - both incoming and outgoing.

For those who are too confused by the above tech talk, the shorter version is this - all of the company email passed through a co-located server that pretty much looked like it was controlled by the Turkish 'partner' in Ultra Services. Ownership and control of a co-located server makes it very easy to set up automatic forwarding and/or archiving of emails as they go in and out. No one would know about it unless they were in on the secret. This is standard operating procedure at large multi-national companies, especially defense contractors. But I doubt most of the American employees at Ultra Services would have given it much thought back in 2003.

Now why is this important? Why should it matter if a bunch of the Turkish employees were sniffing around their colleagues emails? Well, from what I've pieced together from various stories I've heard over the years, frankly, I think someone was lying.

While I can't go into detail at this time, it is my belief that some of the content in those emails was passed on to Army investigators as fact when in truth, the content was a fabrication. Those fabrications may have ultimately lead investigators to put together a false picture - a picture that I worry sidetracked the investigation into the disappearance of Kirk von Ackermann and eventually misdirected the investigation into Ryan Manelick's murder.

Let me walk you through what I am trying to describe.

Hypothetical scenario. Imagine the following chain of events...

Email from Person A to Person B

Person A: Hey, I think something funny is up. I saw John with someone suspicious and I think he passed something under the table to the guy he was meeting with. I bet it was a kickback for a contract.

Person C reads the email and shares it with another colleague, Person D. Person C also reports the story to Army investigators - as first hand fact - that John was seen handing envelopes to a suspicious man.

Army investigators question everyone at Ultra Services. Person D feeling self important  confirms the story as first-hand fact. Person B tells investigators he heard about it from Person A.

Army investigators ask Person A about the story. Person A is caught in a bind so for whatever reasons, he lies a second time and tells Army investigators the story is true.  

Maybe I am the one who is exaggerating. After all, it's not like I have cold hard scientific facts at hand. However, there are at least three 'stories' that I am aware of that I have good reason to believe were based on gross exaggeration and/or fabrication.  While I do have a fantastic imagination, I worry that the original repeating of some of these email stories as truth - rather than at most just idle gossip picked up around the office - may have severely misdirected investigators.

By way of a more concrete example, here's one of the stories:

One More Story
By Megan von Ackermann, Missing in Iraq, December 13, 2006

It was months after Kirk went missing, and there were CID agents in our livingroom. We were all sitting around the table, two dark-suited men, my mother and I. It had been a long and strange conversation. There are any number of stories that could come out of it, but there's just one I want to tell right now.

It was nearly the end of the whole interview. They had been kind, calm, reserved but suddenly they were uncomfortable. They shifted in their chairs and exchanged a look. Finally one cleared his throat.

There was one more thing, something that might be hard...

I didn't know what to think. If they knew what had happened to Kirk surely they would have said something at the start, not waited until the very end of a couple of hours of talk. Months of horrible imagined scenes came quickly to mind.

... there was talk (he said) ... someone had mentioned ... a Russian woman that Kirk might have become friends with.

The above actually ties in with this bit of information from Colin Freeman's very first article in the UK Telegraph:

Mystery surrounds US businessman missing in Iraq's 'Sunni triangle'
By Colin Freeman, UK Telegraph, November 9, 2003

The strange circumstances of the case have prevented investigators from ruling out the possibility that [von Ackermann] has tried to fake his own disappearance. In particular, they are thought to be puzzled as to why he chose to drive alone that day, rather than taking an Iraqi colleague as he normally did.

In more blunt terms: Kirk von Ackermann was rumored to be having an affair with a Russian hostess who worked at a club in Istanbul. Some immigrant Russian women were known to work in Istanbul as prostitutes for pimps who held their passports hostage. Until they buy back their passports, they are essentially trapped. There was speculation that the 'hostess' was actually Russian intelligence trying to recruit American contractors who were working in Iraq. My understanding is investigators never located the woman or the club. Most likely, because she didn't exist.

Now imagine an entire criminal investigation driven on this kind of rumor and innuendo....

Timothy E Bell - missing 7 years

This weekend marks the seven year anniversary since the disappearance of Timothy E. Bell of Mobile, Alabama. On Saturday, his family will be holding a memorial service in his honor.

Bell was abducted in Iraq on April 9, 2004 when the fuel convoy he was driving in was hit by gunfire and rocket-propelled grenades in an attack outside of Baghdad. Nine Americans were killed and at least 17 were injured. Thomas Hamill, truck convoy commander, was taken hostage and later set free by US forces. The remains of SSG Keith "Matt" Maupin, also missing after the attack, were eventually identified. Timothy Bell is the only member of his convoy who has not been accounted for.

Bell is the father of three and previously served in the US Army. He was planning to be married in the summer of 2004. At the time of his disappearance, Bell was a 43-year-old electrician for Halliburton subsidiary KBR.

My sincere condolences to his friends and family.

Memorial Service For Contractor Missing In Iraq
by Jessica Taloney, WKRG, April 07, 2011

April 9 at 10 am
Most Pure Heart of Mary Catholic Church
304 Sengstak Street
Mobile, Alabama

Timothy Edward Bell - obituary
Mobile Press-Register
April 9, 2011

Infrared Video

Army to take new look at friendly fire death
By Joe Gould, Army Times, March 20, 2011

The Army is reinvestigating the 2008 friendly fire death of a 101st Airborne soldier whose team leader shot him and left him to die on the battlefield in Iraq, according to prior inquiries.

The Army has notified David H. Sharrett, the father of Pfc. David Sharrett, 27, that it has launched a new and broader investigation.

An earlier probe found that the team leader, then-1st Lt. Timothy Hanson, left the battlefield on a helicopter while two of his soldiers were unaccounted for. Hanson subsequently received a temporary reprimand, was promoted to captain, and is now in the Reserve.

Sharrett, a former English teacher, has aggressively pressed the Army for information on his son’s death. He said he wants this inquiry, the Army’s third, to provide truth and accountability.

But of particular interest to this blog is this:

For years, Sharrett has met with his son’s colleagues and superiors, investigators and other general officers in an effort to wrangle information about how his son died.

“I’m convinced that decisions were made early on that this is not going above any kind of level,” Sharrett said. “They were not counting on anyone being aggressive in pursuing what the truth was.”

Sharrett said he was eventually able to view gun-sight video from an Apache helicopter that provided a chilling infrared view of the battlefield.

“You can see Hanson getting on the helicopter, you can see [my son] up on the wide screen, he’s struggling, and in the same frame, [the team leader is] leaving,” Sharrett said. “That’s where it really, really got to me.”

A lot of information was collected by the military in Iraq. Somewhere, there's footage and audio that's of direct relevance to the disappearance of Kirk von Ackermann and the murder of his colleague, Ryan Manelick. I guess the big question remains - why didn't investigators pursue those materials?

The Birthday Boys - theater

Throughout March, Theater Unleashed in Hollywood, CA will present The Birthday Boys.

Their brief description of the play, set in 2006 Iraq, 'a gritty and terrifying dark comedy that tracks three United States Marines who have been taken hostage, bound and blindfolded, as they do whatever's necessary to keep their sanity and stay alive.'

The Birthday Boys
Playwright: Aaron Kozak
Director: Jacob Smith
Show Information
NoHo Stages
4934 Lankershim Blvd.
North Hollywood, CA 91601