Summer is here. Americans are still missing in Iraq. The 10th anniversary of the disappearance of Kirk von Ackermann is approaching.
What to do about it?
As everyone now knows from all of the press coverage from the Edward Snowden disclosures, the NSA has been recording the phone conversations of American citizens when one of the parties is outside the United States.
If the NSA really wanted to be the good guys, they would put some effort in to solving Kirk von Ackermann's disappearance.
All the NSA have to do is to listen to and analyze two audio recordings:
1. The voice message Kirk von Ackermann left his wife on their home answering machine on October 8, 2003
2. The phone call ostensibly made by Kirk von Ackermann from his satellite phone to another Ultra Services employee's cell phone on October 9, 2003
Either the voices match and both calls were made by Kirk von Ackermann or the voices do not match and an impostor placed the call for help.
It continues to be my belief that an impostor made that second phone call.
Sunday, June 23, 2013
The Marching of Time
Tuesday, September 11, 2012
Listen to IRONMAN
There is an editorial in the New York Times today regarding Al Qaeda and 9-11 attacks. Will Congress ever take an interest in getting to the bottom of just what really went wrong?
The Deafness Before the Storm
By Kurt Eichenwald, New York Times, September 10, 2012
An excerpt from the editorial:
The direct warnings to Mr. Bush about the possibility of a Qaeda attack began in the spring of 2001. By May 1, the Central Intelligence Agency told the White House of a report that “a group presently in the United States” was planning a terrorist operation. Weeks later, on June 22, the daily brief reported that Qaeda strikes could be “imminent,” although intelligence suggested the time frame was flexible.There was another briefing on July 10. Followed by an assessment by the FBI that prohibited then Attorney General, John Ashcroft, from flying on commercial airlines. And then came the now infamous August 6 briefing, "Bin Laden Determined to Strike in U.S." As time goes on, more and more information continues to trickle out - history will not be kind to those who ignored the warnings.
But some in the administration considered the warning to be just bluster. An intelligence official and a member of the Bush administration both told me in interviews that the neoconservative leaders who had recently assumed power at the Pentagon were warning the White House that the C.I.A. had been fooled; according to this theory, Bin Laden was merely pretending to be planning an attack to distract the administration from Saddam Hussein, whom the neoconservatives saw as a greater threat. Intelligence officials, these sources said, protested that the idea of Bin Laden, an Islamic fundamentalist, conspiring with Mr. Hussein, an Iraqi secularist, was ridiculous, but the neoconservatives’ suspicions were nevertheless carrying the day.
The unit that Kirk von Ackermann was once a member of, DO5 or the Asymmetric Threat Division, was shut down by mid-2001. DO5 was actively engaged in conducting analysis of bin Laden long before it was acceptable to do so.
Which brings us to von Ackermann's former colleague, IRONMAN, the unnamed intelligence officer who has worked tirelessly to get someone to pay attention. IRONMAN filed a formal complaint charging that the Joint Forces intelligence Command had not disclosed all original material relating to the 9/11
Appendix B. (U) Scanned JFIC Response:From IRONMAN's complaint published at Truthout:
2. Did your agency have information prior to Sept 11, 2001, to suggest that international terrorist cells were operating within the United States? If so, please set this information aside for review by the staff of the Joint inquiry.
ANSWER: No, but prior to Sept 11, 2001, neither JFIC nor JFCOM tracked terrorist activity in the United States. The United States was not part of JFCOM's AOR.
(U) Contrary to JFIC's formal report to the JCS staff, JFIC had a direct and assigned purview on international terrorism against the U.S., to include the operations of al-Qa'ida and the 9/11 attackers. JFIC was directly responsible to both Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) and its subordinate, Joint Task Force-Civil Support (JTF-CS) for all-source intelligence anaiysis of international terrorism against the U.S. To ensure the quality of such analysis, JFlC's commanding officer [redacted] established the Asymmetric Threat Branch (DO5), charged with reporting on asymmetric threats, especially terrorism. [redacted] was subsequently promoted to JFCOM J2. As a RADM and PACOM J2, she established another Asymmetric Threat branch at PACOM.)And on it goes.
(U) The Asymmetric Threat Branch in JFIC was a forerunner of current all-source fusion centers. Unlike other analytical offices in the intelligence community, DO5 members had a wide mix of skilis in all six intelligence disciplines - HUMINT, OSINT, COMINT, ELINT, IMINT, and MASINT. Consequently, DO5 was abie to develop and use all-source, original analysis in a manner probably then unprecedented within the intelligence community. DO5 began preparing a wide range of original analysis on asymmetric warfare, especially terrorism, from mid-1998 until mid-2001.
EXCLUSIVE: New Documents Claim Intelligence on Bin Laden, al-Qaeda Targets Withheld From Congress' 9/11 Probe
By Jeffrey Kaye and Jason Leopold, Truthout, June 13, 2011
Attachment - Unclassified FOIA Response
More info and links at the JFIC tag below.
Thursday, May 03, 2012
Capt Stephen Santez USN
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| Captain Stephen F. Santez Jr., USN presenting Captain Kirk von Ackermann, USAF a Joint Service Commendation Medal from the JFIC on April 26, 2000 |
DO5 or the Asymmetric Threat Branch of the Joint Forces Intelligence Command (JFIC) was actively tracking Al Qaida until late 2000-early 2001 when it was inexplicably shut down by commanding officers. Kirk von Ackermann is said to have carried the weight of the prescience of his predictions - his hands tied by more senior officers - for the years to come.
That's not to say his work went unrecognized. As a result of his service with DO5, Kirk von Ackermann received at least one commendation, formally presented by Captain Stephen F. Santez Jr., USN. What event or service to the nation prompted the commendation is unknown. Kirk von Ackermann's wife Megan once wrote:
I heard things about 'briefings' and gradually recognized that the briefings were often to quite senior officers. I know there were commendations and awards, but details were obscured.With the ever increasing role of social networking in and around our modern lives, it should come as no surprise that there is a LinkedIn page for Steve Santez, the same CAPT Santez pictured above. Included on Santez LinkedIn page is a short description of his work experience as the Director of Operations at the Joint Forces Intelligence Command from 1999-2002. It's worth noting that Director of Operations = J3.
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| Screen capture of LinkedIn page for Steve Santez |
Steve SantezThe language in Steve Santez bio more or less mirrors the same language found in the IRONMAN FOIA, Formal Complaint to DoD Inspector General re: JFIC and Congressional Inquiry which accompanies an article at TruthOut by Jeffrey Kaye.
Senior Intelligence Training Development Integrator at BAE Systems
Norfolk, Virginia Area
Defense and Space
http://www.linkedin.com/pub/steve-santez/47/a25/6a9
"…Expert in all-source intelligence with specific emphasis on asymmetric threat analysis, human intelligence, intelligence training development and delivery, and concept development and experimentation leading to results…"
Director of Operations
Joint Forces Intelligence Center
August 1999 – February 2002 (2 years 7 months) Norfolk, Virginia
Drove all intelligence analysis, production and training for the US Joint Forces Command Joint Forces Intelligence Center. Led over 100 military and civilian personnel across all mission areas of analysis, targeting, collections, watch center fusion, and asymmetric threat analysis. Led initial analysis during the Russian submarine KURSK sinking. Director of Operations during disestablishment of the US Atlantic Command and establishment of the US Joint Forces Command. Created the first asymmetric threat division at JFIC in support of Joint Task Force Civil Support and led analysis of Al Qaeda pre 9/11. Agent for change; worked with the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) to migrate Joint Personnel Recovery Intelligence Production to the Joint Forces Intelligence Center.
(U) Contrary to JFIC's formal report to the JCS staff, JFIC had a direct and assigned purview on international terrorism against the U.S., to include the operations of al-Qa'ida and the 9/11 attackers. JFIC was directly responsible to both Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) and its subordinate, Joint Task Force-Civil Support (JTF-CS) for all-source intelligence anaiysis of international terrorism against the U.S. To ensure the quality of such analysis, JFlC's commanding officer [redacted] established the Asymmetric Threat Branch (DO5), charged with reporting on asymmetric threats, especially terrorism. [redacted] was subsequently promoted to JFCOM J2. As a RADM and PACOM J2, she established another Asymmetric Threat branch at PACOM.)For those unfamiliar with the significance of IRONMAN's Formal Complaint, this section should clarify matters:
(U) The Asymmetric Threat Branch in JFIC was a forerunner of current all-source fusion centers. Unlike other analytical offices in the intelligence community, DO5 members had a wide mix of skilis in all six intelligence disciplines - HUMINT, OSINT, COMINT, ELINT, IMINT, and MASINT. Consequently, DO5 was abie to develop and use all-source, original analysis in a manner probably then unprecedented within the intelligence community. DO5 began preparing a wide range of original analysis on asymmetric warfare, especially terrorism, from mid-1998 until mid-2001.
(U) Reports on the most likely targets for domestic and international terrorists, both within the U.S. and abroad, as well as adjunct targets during a traditional war. The most sensitive of these reports were those identifying targets within the U.S., developing scenarios, analysis of commonalities for use in planning responses and recommendations for preventative action. This U.S. tasking was given by JTF-CS.Please keep in mind that all of this work was happening well before September 11, 2001.
(S/NF)The reports were first prepared in the summer of 2000, in support of JTF-CS, and were briefed to the JFCOM J2, JTF-CS J2, and senior JFCOM staff, including the DCINC and J3. The JTF-CS Commander may have also attended the briefings. The first version of the briefing was entitled "The WMD Threat to the U.S.", (information cut off date 16 July 2000). The briefing slides emphasized that New York City was the most difficult consequence management problem, and recommended using NYC as the model for planning /exercises. The oral briefing itself was much more sensitive, indicating that the World Trade Centers # 1 and # 2 were the most likely buildings to be attacked in the U.S., followed closely by the Pentagon. The briefer indicated that the worst case scenario would be one tower collapsed onto the other. The possibility of striking the buildings with a plane may have been discussed then - it was certainly discussed in the red cell analysis leading up to the briefing. The acting Deputy of DO5, [redacted] proposed in the red cell analysis that the building could be struck by a jetliner. Discussion followed on contacting World Trade Center security and engineering/architectural staff, but the idea was not further explored because of a command climate discouraging contact with the civilian community. However, at the end of the briefing, the JFCOM J3 directed that the national military terrorism exercise for FY 02 be based on a New York worse-case scenario. He indicated he would've preferred to have done so in FY 01, but the military was already financially committed to another use (a cruise ship) in FY01.
The lives that could have and should have been protected...
(U) [...] In addition, I and the deputy of that team, [redacted] especially carried the burden of knowledge of how close DoD came to bin Ladin and perhaps being able to reduce the number of lives lost on 9/11. I do not want that burden any longer. [redacted] and I discussed this issue the last time we spoke. He remains the longest missing man in Iraq in this war, and I want, one day, to be able to explain to his children what their father foresaw.The longest missing man in Iraq is Kirk von Ackermann.
Related Reading
DO5 in the News
September 9, 2011
Rear Admiral Rosanne LeVitre, USN
July 21, 2011
Counter Terrorism and JFIC
May 6, 2011
Counter Terrorism and Kirk von Ackermann
October 8, 2006
Joint Service Commendation Medal
January 23, 2006
References
By Jeffrey Kaye, Truthout, May 23, 2011
Allegation of Misleading Congress PDF
To: Hon. Claude M. Kicklighter
DoD Inspector General
From: Edward Maguire
Director of National Intelligence
November 27, 2007
Attachment - Unclassified FOIA Response PDF
April 8, 2011
Formal Complaint to DoD Inspector General
re: JFIC and Congressional Inquiry
May 8, 2006
Review of Joint Forces Intelligence Command Response to 9/11 Commission PDF
Deputy Inspector General for Intelligence
United States Department of Defense
September 23, 2008
Declassified March 5, 2010
From the Federation of American Scientists
Abbreviations - used above
COMINT - Communications Intelligence
DO5 - Asymmetric Threat Division
DOD - Department of Defense
ELINT - Electronic Intelligence
FBI - Federal Bureau of Investigation
HUMINT- Intelligence
IMINT- Imagery Intelligence
J2 - Director for Intelligence
J3 - Director of Operations
JCS - Joint Chiefs of Staff
JFCOM - Joint Forces Command
JFIC - Joint Forces Intelligence Command
JIC - Joint Intelligence Center
JTF-CS - Joint Task Force- Civil Support
MASINT- Measurement and Signature Intelligence
OSINT- Open Source Intelligence
PACOM - Pacific Command
RADM - Rear Admiral
US - United States of America
USAF - United States Air Force
USN - United States Navy
Thursday, February 09, 2012
Hills - aerial photo
Photo taken from a Black Hawk helicopter of the hills that form the ridge line between Tikrit and Kirkuk. Kirk von Ackermann's vehicle was found abandoned in this isolated area and once described as the most dangerous part of the journey from Tikrit to Kirkuk.
From the photo, it looks like the road is unpaved.
Photo credit Faysal Akbik
Description: This series of low hills or mountains stood out as a landmark in a Tikrit to Kirkuk Black Hawk flight.
Left Behind in Iraq
Article on missing military personnel that contains a brief mention of Kirk von Ackermann.
Missing in action: Service members left behind
By Austin Wright, Politico, February 8, 2012
With U.S. combat troops out of Iraq and a time frame for a pullout set in Afghanistan, an ominous question looms: Who will we have left behind?And of course, there's still others missing. There's a link to the list just up there under the header for this blog.
In Iraq, at least one U.S. service member is currently listed as missing, along with three defense contractors. [...]
More than five years later, Altaie’s case remains unsolved and has been turned over to the missing personnel office, along with those of three missing defense contractors: Kirk Von Ackermann, lost since 2003; Timothy Bell, lost since 2004; and Adnan al-Hilawi, lost since 2007.
Investigators spent the past two months reviewing files and crafting plans for how to proceed on each case. “It’s a lot of reading through records of various things that have happened in the past and putting that all together,” said the official at the missing personnel office. “It’s like detective work.”
The DPMO website cites 4 men as missing - see below. And yet, other contractors are known to still be missing. My only guess as to why others were omitted from the DPMO list is they weren't working under contract for the Department of Defense.
Operation Iraqi Freedom, 2003-2010
- Staff Sgt. Ahmed K. Altaie, U.S. Army, was lost on Oct. 23, 2006 while serving in Iraq as a translator for the U.S. military
- Mr. Kirk Von Ackermann, DoD contractor, was lost on Oct. 9, 2003, while working in Forward Operating Base Pacesetter, Iraq
- Mr. Timothy E. Bell, DoD contractor, was lost on April 9, 2004, while working in Baghdad, Iraq
- Mr. Adnan al-Hilawi, DoD contractor, was lost on March 3, 2007, while working in Baghdad, Iraq
Friday, September 09, 2011
DO5 in the News
Jeffrey Kaye and Jason Leopold have a new article on the former military intelligence unit, DO5, and its work tracking Osama bin Laden over at Truthout. Kirk von Ackermann, the longest missing American in Iraq, while serving in the US Air Force, was a member of DO5. DO5 also known as the Asymmetric Threat Division, was created by the Director of Intelligence of Joint Forces Command.
New Documents Suggest DoD Watchdog Covered Up Intelligence Unit's Work Tracking 9/11 Terrorists
By Jeffrey Kaye and Jason Leopold
Truthout, September 9, 2011
Declassified powerpoint slides obtained by FOIA accompany the article. I'm a bit curious if anyone has filed an FOIA for the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) mentioned on Slide #2. (I like paper trails....)
Also worth your attention, there's an interview with author Jeffrey Kaye on theReal News.com discussing his research.
So. Still blogging. Anniversary of Kirk von Ackermann's disappearance is coming up - number 8. And still no answers.
Addendum:
Additional commentary and discussion with Jeffrey Kaye over at the Dissenter at FireDogLake.
IG Report Cover-up: Top Military Officials Hid Evidence of Pre-9/11 Al Qaeda Intelligence
By Jeffrey Kaye, September 10, 2011
In particular, Kaye's commentary is worth reading carefully. He notes, "...The falsification was meant in particular to hide the work of the 9-person unit within JFIC, known as the Asymmetrical Threats Division, or DO5 in military lingo."
The following 6 individuals were at some point associated with the Asymmetric Threat Division during the tenure of Captain Kirk von Ackermann between November 1999 into 2000 (exact end date unknown).
Commander Rear Admiral Rose LeVitre, USN
Director Captain Janice M. Dundas USN
Captain Stephen F. Santez Jr., USN
Division Head Major Oliver Wright III, US Army
Deputy Division Head John Rodriguez NCIS
Captain Kirk von Ackermann USAF
Sunday, July 24, 2011
JFIC Project
Trying to put together a table of who's who at Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) and it's subordinate, Joint Forces Intelligence Command (JFIC) during the critical 1999 to 2001 time frame. It's in table format and can be found here:
USJFCOM
Most of the information in the chart has been gleaned from online biographies of retired military personnel who have entered the private sector. Some of the names and dates are from the Inspector General report. Kirk von Ackermann first reported to JFIC for Information Operations in November 1999. He was quickly attached to the asymmetric threat group, DO5.
I'll update the chart as more information becomes available.
Review of Joint Forces Intelligence Command Response to 9/11 Commission
Deputy Inspector General for Intelligence
United States Department of Defense
September 23, 2008
Declassified March 5, 2010
Thursday, July 14, 2011
What did Kirk see?
More thinking out loud.....and nit picking.
In November 1999, Captain Kirk von Ackermann, USAF, arrived to work at Joint Forces Intelligence Command in Virginia, where he was assigned to counter terrorism.
In trying to describe her husband and how his work was slowly consuming his entire life, Megan von Ackermann wrote a very short passage that took place somewhere in the vicinity of Virginia:
Dual LivesAssuming what was written is accurate, it means JFIC more or less lied, at least once, in its response to the Deputy Inspector General for Intelligence.
By Megan von Ackermann, Missing in Iraq, September 5, 2006
Like the time [Kirk] glanced over as we passed a local bank, stiffened and muttered something about 'so they use that one...' I think he had recognized someone going into the bank, and now part of him was concerned with working out how to use this unexpected windfall of information.
Appendix B. (U) Scanned JFIC Response:Then why was a JFIC counter terrorism officer so interested in someone he saw outside of a bank? Why did that officer refer to 'they' - plural - unless the subject observed was connected to or a member of an already known group that - at best - was only 'suspected' of ties to terrorists?
2. Did your agency have information prior to Sept 11, 2001, to suggest that international terrorist cells were operating within the United States? If so, please set this information aside for review by the staff of the Joint inquiry.
ANSWER: No, but prior to Sept 11, 2001, neither JFIC nor JFCOM tracked terrorist activity in the United States. The United States was not part of JFCOM's AOR.
What did Kirk see and who exactly did he pass that information on to? More importantly, what did the recipient do with it?
References
Attachment - Unclassified FOIA Response PDF
FOIA response
April 8, 2011
Formal Complaint to DoD Inspector General
re: JFIC and Congressional Inquiry
May 8, 2006
Review of Joint Forces Intelligence Command Response to 9/11 Commission PDF
Deputy Inspector General for Intelligence
United States Department of Defense
September 23, 2008
Declassified March 5, 2010
From the Federation of American Scientists
Report: Intelligence Unit Told Before 9/11 to Stop Tracking Bin Laden
By Jeffrey Kaye, Truthout, May 23, 2011
Monday, June 13, 2011
Truthout - Intelligence Withheld From Congress
PS. I just want to take a moment to publicly thank all of the contractors, as well as the military, intelligence, and private military personnel who have graciously shared their knowledge and experience with me over the years. Their information has helped me to better understand the incredibly complex world that men (and women) like Kirk von Ackermann work in.
While working for Ultra Services of Istanbul Turkey, an American contractor and former intelligence officer, Kirk von Ackermann, disappeared on an isolated road in Iraq on October 9, 2003. He remains the longest missing American in Iraq today.
This blog is loaded with over 7 years of research about the incident as well as the murder of his colleague, Ryan Manelick, who died in December 2003. My own personal belief is that von Ackermann was killed because he was mistaken for John Dawkins who was for all intents and purposes part owner of Ultra Services.
At one point, I discussed the case with one of Kirk von Ackermann's former colleagues and shared my thoughts but for some reason, the scenario I outlined seemed like too much of a stretch. Which is a kind of twisted irony - even in death - Kirk von Ackermann just remains too far outside the socially acceptable, just like the scenarios he once imagined as an intelligence officer.
Truthout
Jeffrey Kaye continues lifting the veil on 9-11 intelligence failures with a new article at Truthout. The end of the article reviews some of what is known in public about Kirk von Ackermann.
I should probably just go on record and reveal that I first learned of the Asymmetric Threat Division - by name - back in 2005. I was under the impression the name of the group was classified and thus never revealed it. I was also once told that Kirk von Ackermann was possibly one of the finest intelligence officers to work for the DoD in the last century. He was said to have had an incredible talent for connecting seemingly unrelated details. I was told his work saved lives - literally.
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| Insert of the last page of documents from an Unclassified FOIA Response included with the article at Truthout, EXCLUSIVE: New Documents Claim Intelligence on Bin Laden, al-Qaeda Targets Withheld From Congress' 9/11 Probe by Jeffrey Kaye and Jason Leopold, June 13, 2011. |
EXCLUSIVE: New Documents Claim Intelligence on Bin Laden, al-Qaeda Targets Withheld From Congress' 9/11 ProbeThe last page of the FOIA Response - which quotes IRONMAN - holds particular interest for this blog.
By Jeffrey Kaye and Jason Leopold, Truthout, June 13, 2011
Attachment - Unclassified FOIA Response
(U) [unclassified] My motivation for this complaint is multi-faceted. I do believe that knowledge of the work done by DO5 would add to DoD's understanding of its role in the events leading up to 9/11 and how to avoid future attacks. For this reason, and other more personal reasons, I believe that DO5's analysis, especially the target analysis, should be reviewed and, if possible, declassified. I have been falsely accused of revealing classified information on DO5's work, when I am certain that that information is not and has not been classified since 9/11, and I do want to see myself cleared of that false accusation. In addition, I and the deputy of that team, [redacted] especially carried the burden of knowledge of how close DoD came to bin Laden and perhaps being able to reduce the number of lives lost on 9/11. I do not want that burden any longer. [redacted] [redacted] and I discussed this issue the last time we spoke. He remains the longest missing man in Iraq in this war, and I want, one day, to be able to explain to his children what their father foresaw.The former deputy of the Asymmetric Threat Division and the longest missing man in Iraq is Kirk von Ackermann. The complicated and contentious history of the company he worked for in Iraq, Ultra Services, was featured in a 2006 article at ePluribus Media.
One Missing, One Dead: An Iraq Contractor in the Fog of WarThe US Army CID did the best investigation they could with the information available to them. But they were horribly lead astray by working with the assumption that Kirk von Ackermann disappeared from where his vehicle was found. Von Ackermann's military experience - especially as detailed in the Unclassified FOIA Response - makes clear the events of that day were well outside his norm of behavior.
By Susie Dow, ePluribus Media, May 12, 2006
NSA audio recordings
On October 8, 2003, the day before he disappeared, Kirk von Ackermann called his wife in the United States from Iraq. He left a short message on their home answering machine.
The following day, October 9, just minutes before he 'disappeared', von Ackermann using his satellite phone reportedly called the cell phone of an Iraqi employee and requested help with a bad tire. Several minutes later, a passing patrol reported an abandoned vehicle just several miles down the road from a manned checkpoint. The Iraqi employee arrived approximately 45 minutes later.
It is my belief that an impostor placed that satellite call to the Iraqi employee - who due to limited language skills with English would be unable to tell the difference between two English speaking men's voices.
NSA has audio files of satellite phone calls originating in Iraq during this time period and is in a position to facilitate an analysis to see if in fact the male who placed the call to the Iraqi employee was Kirk von Ackermann. It defies any and all logic that Kirk von Ackermann deliberately drove alone with a bad tire - and without a translator - on a journey of over 165 miles through Iraq, with 7 of those miles on an isolated ridge he had previously identified as the most dangerous part of the journey between Tikrit and Kirkuk.
Perhaps investigators will finally get around to treating the disappearance of Kirk von Ackermann as the unsolved murder that it is.
Additional Reading
DoD Whistleblower: Documents Show Intel Withheld from 9/11 Congressional Investigators - author discussion and commentary of the Truthout article
By Jeff Kaye, FireDogLake, June 13, 2011
Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities before and after the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001
Report of the joint inquiry motivated IRON MAN's formal complaint, that JFIC withheld intelligence from congress
S. Rept. 107-351 and H. Rept. 107-792
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
U.S. Government Printing Office
December 2002
And because no one clicks on links anymore....
Dual LivesAfter Y2K, Kirk became more and more consumed by the counter-terrorism world. He was read into higher and higher clearances, learned more and more about the largest threats to the US and her allies. Specifically he became deeply aware of Osama Bin Ladin and his organization.
Kirk was involved with designing readiness excercises - scenarios to be used by various units as they tested their skills. He proposed that a small boat filled with explosives be used as a weapon against a large warship - and was told it was an unrealistic idea. This was, of course, well prior to the USS Cole attack.
He also, along with his team, not only suggested that a commercial jet could be used as a terrorist weapon, but predicted the most likely targets that would be chosen. Again, he was ignored, and sometimes laughed at.
By Megan von Ackermann, Missing in Iraq, September 5, 2006
One afternoon we were driving up the highway outside of Langley. I was reading a magazine - the Smithsonian I think - and I was chatting to Kirk about an article discussing the greatest achievement of modern medicine: the successful campaign against smallpox. Wasn't it amazing, I said, the way the WHO had managed it, wasn't it wonderful that the world was safe now from a disease that had been a deadly threat for thousands of years. Very quietly, his hands stiff on the wheel, he said 'it's not gone.'Now tell me that same man, Kirk von Ackermann, chose to deliberately drive alone in an SUV with a bad tire over 165 miles without a translator most of it through Saddam Hussein's tribal area. Didn't happen.....
Just that. But I knew - I knew that not only did he know that more than one country had kept live samples of the virus, he knew intimately the infection rate, the symptoms, the horrific scarring that those lucky enough to survive would suffer. He knew how it could be weaponized, had thought about delivery systems, had worked through countless scenarios in which various populations were targeted and infected.
And gradually I realized that he was living like that constantly. Everywhere we went, there was part of him looking around and evaluating targets, thinking about blast zones, considering mortality rates, political value, public reaction.
Monday, May 23, 2011
Truthout - Unasked Questions
It's a strange feeling to come across an article that mentions yourself.
Jeffrey Kaye of Truthout has written a detailed overview of the recent report from the Deputy Inspector General for Intelligence of the Department of Defense, Report: Intelligence Unit Told Before 9/11 to Stop Tracking Bin Laden. The report stems from a whistleblower complaint that alleged that "...the Joint Forces Intelligence Command had not disclosed all material to the 9/11 Commission." It is very fortunate that Jeffrey Kaye took an active interest in the report as my interest was not so much its findings rather I was much more interested in learning about the work of Capt. Kirk von Ackermann USAF at Joint Forces Intelligence Command (JFIC).
At the end of Kaye's article he quotes a statement I made here on this blog:
Dow noted the [Inspector General] report's conclusion: "The analysis completed by the Joint Forces Intelligence Command, specifically the Asymmetric Threat Division, was not applicable to the questions asked by the 9/11 Commission."Question
"Which leads me to believe the 9/11 Commission did not ask the correct questions," Dow said.
Now, I fully admit, I have a bias. I see things as they relate to what I have learned of Kirk von Ackermann. So, one 'correct question' that immediately jumps to my mind - a question that the 9/11 Commission apparently did not ask the Asymmetric Threat Division - is this:
Did the Asymmetric Threat Division at any time prepare readiness excercises that involved the use of commercial aircraft as weapons? If yes: a. what were the predicted targets and b. who was that information disseminated to?Because 'readiness exercises' were one of the things that Kirk von Ackermann was doing while at the Joint Forces Intelligence Command. And yes. Commercial aircraft used as weapons by flying them fully fueled in to buildings - like the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and the White House - was one of the scenarios that he predicted.
Cold Case File
For the past 7+ years, I've been researching and writing about the disappearance of Kirk von Ackermann as well as the murder of his colleague Ryan Manelick. I remain dis-satisfied with CID findings to date, first and foremost starting with the assumption that Kirk von Ackermann actually disappeared from where his vehicle was found. To arrive at such a conclusion - as tempting as it may be - requires suspending all logic. (See: The Bridge Theory and Missing Contractor: Military Mechanics May Hold the Keys)
I'd just like to see CID re-open the case and look at all of the evidence in chronological order with fresh eyes. Suspect everyone, spare no one from investigation - including the military personnel who first reported finding his abandoned vehicle.
References
Report: Intelligence Unit Told Before 9/11 to Stop Tracking Bin Laden
By Jeffrey Kaye, Truthout, May 23, 2011
DoD Inspector General: Intel Agency Ordered to Stop Pre-9/11 Tracking of Bin Laden - author discussion and commentary of the Truthout article
By Jeff Kaye, FireDogLake, May 24, 2011
Review of Joint Forces Intelligence Command Response to 9/11 Commission PDF
Deputy Inspector General for Intelligence
Department of Defense
September 23, 2008
Counter Terrorism and JFIC
By Susie Dow, Missing Man, May 6, 2011
Counter Terrorism and Kirk von Ackermann
By Susie Dow, Missing Man, October 8, 2006
Getting to Iraq part two: Counter Terrorism
By Megan von Ackermann, Missing in Iraq, March 24, 2006
After Y2K, Kirk became more and more consumed by the counter-terrorism world. He was read into higher and higher clearances, learned more and more about the largest threats to the US and her allies. Specifically he became deeply aware of Osama Bin Ladin and his organization.
Kirk was involved with designing readiness excercises - scenarios to be used by various units as they tested their skills. He proposed that a small boat filled with explosives be used as a weapon against a large warship - and was told it was an unrealistic idea. This was, of course, well prior to the USS Cole attack.
He also, along with his team, not only suggested that a commercial jet could be used as a terrorist weapon, but predicted the most likely targets that would be chosen. Again, he was ignored, and sometimes laughed at.
Friday, May 06, 2011
Counter Terrorism and JFIC
I stumbled upon a fascinating report today, Review of Joint Forces Intelligence Command Response to 9/11 Commission.
According to Secrecy News Volume 2010 Issue No. 18 of March 9, 2010, the review was only recently declassified. Also see this March 5, 2010 cover letter to the original November 4, 2008 FOIA request from the Department of Defense Inspector General.
Page 9 - ObjectiveThe review notes and confirms that JFIC was never identified in the 9/11 Commission Report.
(U) The objective was to determine whether the JFIC [Joint Forces Intelligence Command] misled Congress by willfully withholding operational information in response to the 9/11 Commission.
At first glance, it might seem that this review has little relationship to this blog. But there, smack dab in the middle of the review, are members of the Joint Forces Intelligence Command that former USAF Capt. Kirk von Ackermann once associated with.
So with all of the news coverage about the death of Osama bin Laden, I thought now would be a good time to look at what is known about von Ackermann's previous work in counter terrorism while serving in the US Air Force. While a general overview of anecdotes can be found here: Counter Terrorism and Kirk von Ackermann, what I'm after are the specifics - who, what, when.
So let's start with the photos and try to peel this apart.
Review of Joint Forces Intelligence Command Response to 9/11 Commission
Report No. 2008-INTEL-15
Inspector General United States Department of Defense
September 23, 2008
Page 5 - Executive Summary - Background
(U) The Joint Forces Intelligence Command was established in 1999 and was subordinate to the United States Joint Forces Command. The mission of the Joint Forces Intelligence Command was "to provide general and direct intelligence support to United States Joint Forces Command, United States Joint Forces Command staff directorates, subordinate unified commands, joint task forces, Service component commands and subordinate joint forces commands tasked with executing United States Forces Command geographic or functional missions." In 1999, the Joint Forces Intelligence Command created the Asymmetric Threat Division to take a non-traditional approach to analysis. The Asymmetric Threat Division provided current intelligence briefings and produced Worlwide Terrorist Threat Summary in support of the Intelligence Director for the United States Joint Forces Command. The Asymmetric Threat Division also provided support to the Joint Task Force-Civil Support. The Joint Task Force-Civil Support assisted civil authorities with disaster assistance.According to his wife's blog, Capt. von Ackermann headed up the Y2K task force - which places him at JFIC prior to January 2000 - as well as attended some White House intelligence briefings. She was under the impression he had analyzed the threat of the weaponization of small pox as well as proposed unorthodox methods of attacking United States interests. Small pox - a biological weapon - is an important detail.
Page 6
The analysis completed by the Joint Forces Intelligence Command, specifically the Asymmetric Threat Division, was not applicable to the questions asked by the 9/11 Commission.Which leads me to believe the 9/11 Commission did not ask the correct questions. Anyway...back to the review.
Appendix B. (U) Scanned JFIC Response:
Page 17 - Request
Please provide a list of the officers within your agency that are principally responsible for counter-terrorism activities on a day-to-day basis and identify the heads and deputy heads of these offices and their dates of service from 1995 to present. (Note: we are not asking for everyone in supervisory chain of such officials). If the individuals occupying these positions are current employees of your agency, please indicate this.Page 18 - Response
Nov 1999-Summer 2001: Asymmetric Threat Division, Division Head MAJ Oliver Wright III (USA) still at JFIC, Deputy John Rodriguez (NCIS) now at DIA.Von Ackermann was receiving accolades from the JFIC in the Spring of 2000. His participation on the Y2K task force makes clear he was already serving at JFIC at the very latest by December of 1999.
Appendix C. (U) Scanned USJFCOM Response:
Page 20
Subject: Congressional Inquiry into 11 September 2001 Terrorist Attack (U)As mentioned, CAPT J. M. Dundas signed a letter on JFIC letterhead dated March 20, 2000, attached to a Certificate of Appreciation issued to Capt. von Ackermann.
(U) JFIC did not track in-CONUS foreign threat or terrorist information prior to 11 Sep 01, so its answers to Mr. Snider's questions are mostly negative. The answers are attached to this email; they have been reviewed by CAPT Janice Dundas USN, JFIC Commander.
(signed)
Maj. John A. Robinson, USAF
Page 30
Appended below are the Joint Force Intelligence Command's replies to the Congressional Inquiry questions tasked by VADM Wilson. JFIC POC is CDR Mike Villareal. JFIC ADJ. DSN 836-7168 JFCOM/J2 POC is Maj. John Robinson. JFCOM/J237, DSN 836-6006It's unclear if any of the above three men served at JFIC during the same time as Capt. von Ackermann.
Page 31 - Question
What does your agency consider its marching orders both past (since 1985) and present, in terms of its responsibilities in the counter-terrorism arena, ie. what documents establish your requirements and priorities? Please identify these by title and set them aside for review by the staff of the joint inquiry.Page 32 - Response
b. Fall 1999-Sep 11, 2001: Focus on Asymmetric Threats OCONUS to include terrorism and CBRN [Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear threats] issues. As Joint Force Provider, emphasis was on force protection for JFCOM Components and support to JTF-CS (Joint Task Force-Civil Support). JFCOM J2 and JTF-CS PIRs set the requirements.And that's where it becomes crystal clear that Capt. von Ackermann - the counter terrorism officer - was assigned to the Asymmetric Threat Division cited earlier in the review. As 'Asymmetric Threats' included terrorism and biological threats - there's the link to the weaponization of small pox mentioned above.
Some statements from the JFCOM website from the Spring of 2000:
US Joint Forces Command
11: New Name, Future Focus
In October 1999, the name of Atlantic Command changed to United States Joint Forces Command to emphasize the command's role leading transformation of U.S. military forcesA news article from the time period describes the Joint Vision 2020 report mentioned above. Two paragraphs stand out.
Still one of five geographic combatant unified commands, U.S. Joint Forces Command formally took on a more functional role with the new name. It is the only unified command with both a geographic area and functional responsibilities.
Joint Forces Command gained a functional mandate to lead transformation of U.S. military joint warfighting into the 21st Century. The command's geographical responsibility was modified to more closely align with existing NATO Allied Command Atlantic's (ACLANT) area of responsibility -- both a long history of cooperation with European Allies and recent history in Central Europe indicate future military operations will not only be joint, but also combined national efforts.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Vision 2020 [Ed note: this document was released May 20, 2000] projects that conflicts of the future will go to the side with the right technology, applied at the right time with the right warrior. Re-designation reflected the command's commitment to experimentation with new warfighting concepts and technologies that answer the call in the Joint Chiefs vision.
Concurrently the command was charged to answer another national call to support terrorist response operations in the continental U.S. Joint Forces Command created the first domestic Joint Task Force, JTF-Civil Support, to provide military assistance to civil authorities, like the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and FBI, for consequence management of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) incidents in the United States.
Joint Vision 2020 Emphasizes Full-spectrum Dominance
By Jim Garamone, American Forces Press Service, June 2, 2000
Adversaries will probably not challenge U.S. strengths, but seek to attack the United States and its interests through "asymmetric means." They could identify vulnerable areas and devise means to attack them.Prior to going to Iraq, counter terrorism was the world in which Kirk von Ackermann was immersed. How can anyone honestly think he then forgot all of his training and experience, jumped into an unfamiliar SUV in Iraq, drove 180 miles - much of it on an isolated road - alone - with a bad tire.
"The potential of such asymmetric approaches is perhaps the most serious danger the United States faces in the immediate future - - and this danger includes long-range ballistic missiles and other direct threats to U.S. citizens and territory," the report says.
Such reasoning defies logic.
References
Review of Joint Forces Intelligence Command Response to 9/11 Commission PDF
Deputy Inspector General for Intelligence
Department of Defense
September 23, 2008
Thursday, April 14, 2011
The Gossip Grapevine or the Anatomy of a Lie
Still wandering through the piles of my research files on the disappearance of Kirk von Ackermann and the murder of Ryan Manelick.
One of the topics I'd like to cover is email - specifically some background on the ultra-services.com email server. You know what small offices are like - everyone loves the water cooler gossip. Well, taking things a step further, there is a very good chance someone was intercepting and reading Ultra Services email. At a later date, I'll walk readers through all of the technical research that lays out the details and who I think was involved in the snooping but for now, I'm just going to provide a general overview.
Ultra Services had a website and used company email. The website was ultra-services.com and the company email addresses were john@ultra-services.com, ryan@ultra-services.com, charles@ultra-services.com, kirk@ultra-services.com, etc. It was a pretty basic set up.
The IP address for ultra-services.com was a co-located server in Turkey. Because of the domains associated within that specific block of addresses back in 2003, it's fairly easy to deduce that some if not all of the Turkish colleagues who were involved with Ultra Services had easy access to others emails - both incoming and outgoing.
For those who are too confused by the above tech talk, the shorter version is this - all of the company email passed through a co-located server that pretty much looked like it was controlled by the Turkish 'partner' in Ultra Services. Ownership and control of a co-located server makes it very easy to set up automatic forwarding and/or archiving of emails as they go in and out. No one would know about it unless they were in on the secret. This is standard operating procedure at large multi-national companies, especially defense contractors. But I doubt most of the American employees at Ultra Services would have given it much thought back in 2003.
Now why is this important? Why should it matter if a bunch of the Turkish employees were sniffing around their colleagues emails? Well, from what I've pieced together from various stories I've heard over the years, frankly, I think someone was lying.
While I can't go into detail at this time, it is my belief that some of the content in those emails was passed on to Army investigators as fact when in truth, the content was a fabrication. Those fabrications may have ultimately lead investigators to put together a false picture - a picture that I worry sidetracked the investigation into the disappearance of Kirk von Ackermann and eventually misdirected the investigation into Ryan Manelick's murder.
Let me walk you through what I am trying to describe.
Hypothetical scenario. Imagine the following chain of events...
Email from Person A to Person BMaybe I am the one who is exaggerating. After all, it's not like I have cold hard scientific facts at hand. However, there are at least three 'stories' that I am aware of that I have good reason to believe were based on gross exaggeration and/or fabrication. While I do have a fantastic imagination, I worry that the original repeating of some of these email stories as truth - rather than at most just idle gossip picked up around the office - may have severely misdirected investigators.
Person A: Hey, I think something funny is up. I saw John with someone suspicious and I think he passed something under the table to the guy he was meeting with. I bet it was a kickback for a contract.Person C reads the email and shares it with another colleague, Person D. Person C also reports the story to Army investigators - as first hand fact - that John was seen handing envelopes to a suspicious man.
Army investigators question everyone at Ultra Services. Person D feeling self important confirms the story as first-hand fact. Person B tells investigators he heard about it from Person A.
Army investigators ask Person A about the story. Person A is caught in a bind so for whatever reasons, he lies a second time and tells Army investigators the story is true.
By way of a more concrete example, here's one of the stories:
One More Story
By Megan von Ackermann, Missing in Iraq, December 13, 2006
It was months after Kirk went missing, and there were CID agents in our livingroom. We were all sitting around the table, two dark-suited men, my mother and I. It had been a long and strange conversation. There are any number of stories that could come out of it, but there's just one I want to tell right now.The above actually ties in with this bit of information from Colin Freeman's very first article in the UK Telegraph:
It was nearly the end of the whole interview. They had been kind, calm, reserved but suddenly they were uncomfortable. They shifted in their chairs and exchanged a look. Finally one cleared his throat.
There was one more thing, something that might be hard...
I didn't know what to think. If they knew what had happened to Kirk surely they would have said something at the start, not waited until the very end of a couple of hours of talk. Months of horrible imagined scenes came quickly to mind.
... there was talk (he said) ... someone had mentioned ... a Russian woman that Kirk might have become friends with.
Mystery surrounds US businessman missing in Iraq's 'Sunni triangle'
By Colin Freeman, UK Telegraph, November 9, 2003
The strange circumstances of the case have prevented investigators from ruling out the possibility that [von Ackermann] has tried to fake his own disappearance. In particular, they are thought to be puzzled as to why he chose to drive alone that day, rather than taking an Iraqi colleague as he normally did.In more blunt terms: Kirk von Ackermann was rumored to be having an affair with a Russian hostess who worked at a club in Istanbul. Some immigrant Russian women were known to work in Istanbul as prostitutes for pimps who held their passports hostage. Until they buy back their passports, they are essentially trapped. There was speculation that the 'hostess' was actually Russian intelligence trying to recruit American contractors who were working in Iraq. My understanding is investigators never located the woman or the club. Most likely, because she didn't exist.
Now imagine an entire criminal investigation driven on this kind of rumor and innuendo....
Wednesday, March 02, 2011
Old Photos
Looking back through some of my old notes and I came across some things that I don't believe I ever posted here.
Aerial photo of a portion of the Jabal Hamryn ridge. The road between Tikrit and Kirkuk crosses this ridge. Kirk von Ackermann described the area as the most dangerous section of road to drive on - his vehicle would later be discovered abandoned there. Unfortunately, I don't know where I found the photo nor which section of the ridge is shown. It looks like it might to the south of the Tikrit-Kirkuk road.
Next up is an article on the Balad Burn Pit - an unfortunately easy place to dispose of a dead body.
Engineers Operate Burn Pit in Balad
By Pfc Abel Trevino, 28th Public Affairs Detachment, Defend America, October 2004
I forgot about this one.
This is a satellite photo of a massive dust storm - 1300 miles wide - that hit the Gulf of Oman region on December 13, 2003, the day before Ryan Manelick was killed in a drive by shooting. The car used in the drive by was described as a 'nice white Landcruiser' in an email from John Dawkins to Greg Manelick. I've always wondered if Iraq - further to the north - was also hit by dust storms that day. And if so, what does a 'nice white' car say about Manelick's assailants.
Friday, September 24, 2010
Come Hell or High Water
Reading through some of my old blog posts here at the Missing Man, I came across this one from back in 2006, Counter Terrorism and Kirk von Ackermann. It's a stunning reminder of just how much has been assumed to date - that Kirk von Ackermann drove his suv knowing it had a bad tire over 180 miles of isolated road in Iraq. That von Ackermann was capable of making a dozen bad decisions on the day he disappeared, it's just not possible.
This man did not drive alone through an isolated mountain range in Iraq:
dual lives
By Megan von Ackermann, Missing in Iraq, September 05, 2006
One afternoon we were driving up the highway outside of Langley. I was reading a magazine - the Smithsonian I think - and I was chatting to Kirk about an article discussing the greatest achievement of modern medicine: the successful campaign against smallpox. Wasn't it amazing, I said, the way the WHO had managed it, wasn't it wonderful that the world was safe now from a disease that had been a deadly threat for thousands of years. Very quietly, his hands stiff on the wheel, he said 'it's not gone.'I continue to maintain that the person who drove the Nissan Patrol and abandoned it by the side of the road in Iraq, the person who used the satellite phone to call an Iraqi employee for help, is the same person who murdered Kirk von Ackermann.
Just that. But I knew - I knew that not only did he know that more than one country had kept live samples of the virus, he knew intimately the infection rate, the symptoms, the horrific scarring that those lucky enough to survive would suffer. He knew how it could be weaponized, had thought about delivery systems, had worked through countless scenarios in which various populations were targeted and infected.
And gradually I realized that he was living like that constantly. Everywhere we went, there was part of him looking around and evaluating targets, thinking about blast zones, considering mortality rates, political value, public reaction.
You can read why in a re-print of an article I wrote:
Missing Contractor: Military Mechanics May Hold the Keys, April 21, 2008.
Now here's the thing. I've spent the last three years trying to get someone to listen. And honestly, nobody cares.
So I'm rethinking my approach because it would be irresponsible on my part to just walk away.
Monday, June 28, 2010
On Thwarted FOIA Requests
Come on universe, help me out here.
Recently, I found out that the mailing address for ePluribus Media changed. Unfortunately, no one alerted me and that change may have botched my outstanding FOIA requests. As a result, it looks like I now have to re-file everything. Literally, years of effort just washed down the drain.
One of the requests I was waiting on (already several years old) was an administrative appeal with the National Security Agency. The request sought two audio recordings of satellite phone calls made by Kirk von Ackermann shortly before he disappeared: the first, a call home to his family the day before he disappeared; the second, the satellite phone call to an Iraqi employee for assistance with a bad tire on the day.
The second significant FOIA request to re-file is for base access records showing exit and entrance on and off American bases in the Balad-Tikrit region in the fall of 2003. The base access records were an attempt to disprove my own theory that Kirk von Ackermann sought to fix his bad tire and visited another base after he left FOB Pacesetter. It was also an attempt to construct a timeline of the days just prior to the murder of Ryan Manelick and the disappearance of Kirk von Ackermann.
I'm hoping that the FOIA case numbers assigned to the original requests might expedite matters. But, it's government bureaucracy we're talking about here and I am not optimistic.
I believe one month from tomorrow is Kirk von Ackermann's birthday. While I never had the opportunity to meet him, I feel an enormous amount of responsiblity to continue to press forward with the FOIA requests no matter how futile those attempts may be.
So, in honor of Kirk von Ackermann, here's an early birthday wish: please find those still missing in Iraq and bring them home.
Tuesday, June 08, 2010
Searching for one white Nissan Patrol in Iraq
To recap: on October 9, 2003, Kirk von Ackermann's white Nissan Patrol suv was discovered abandoned on a remote road in the Jabal Hamrin mountains between Tikrit and Kirkuk just minutes after he was said to have called an employee for help with a flat tire. Where did the vehicle come from? Was he all alone on the road that day or were there other vehicles in close proximity? Did anyone from the Defense Intelligence Agency ever look through the satellite footage to track the journey of his vehicle from FOB Pacesetter to that remote road on a mountain pass?
U.S. military turns to TV for surveillance technology
By Julian E. Barnes, Los Angeles Times, June 7, 2010
The military once stored Predator video in much the same way it handled photos from a U-2 spy plane or a satellite: It chopped the video into short clips and filed it by date and location.Better late than never.
But new technologies developed by firms such as Harris Corp. and Lockheed Martin record the observations of analysts who monitor the video feeds, creating a database of terms and footage that can later be searched.
For instance, every time a white truck appears on video, an analyst will type "white truck." The observation automatically tags that portion of the video. Later, if someone wants to find all the white trucks that passed by a particular building, all they need to do is designate the area of interest and the time frame and search for "white truck."
The Air Force hopes that eventually, such emerging technology will automatically give people, places and vehicles more unique identifiers. Then, the database will be able to search for specific white trucks, such as one with a dented fender or any other unique mark.
Sunday, May 09, 2010
Miles Per Gallon
Thinking a lot about fuel these days.
Mileage for a Nissan Patrol (diesel fuel) averaged about 21 - 23 mpg back in 2003. A full tank held 125 liters of fuel (about 33 gallons). Under good conditions, it's reasonable to expect a full tank of gas should last about 759 miles. And logic says anyone setting out on a journey from Tikrit to Kirkuk would want to start with a full tank.
So, how much was left in the tank when the vehicle was found and what does that say about where the Nissan Patrol last fueled up?
References
Road test: Nissan Patrol ST 3.0
By Feann Torr, Web Wombat
Tuesday, April 06, 2010
Aerial Surveillance Footage - pt 2
Wikileaks recently released classified audio/video from Apache helicopters in Iraq. The footage shows the July 2007 attack by U.S. forces that killed a Reuters journalist and several bystanders. The controversial subject of the video is not relevant to this blog but the quality of that classified video is. The amount of detail the cameras captured is incredible.
Related
Saturday, March 06, 2010
Evidence - physical and other
Aerial footage - recorded by any of the more than 500 unmanned aerial vehicles operating in Iraq in 2003
Base Access Records - showing entrance and exit to/from bases under US control in Iraq
Audio recordings - of satellite and cell phone calls, incoming and outgoing (from intercepts of the National Security Agency)
Inventory - review of Kirk von Ackermann's personal belongings - including his notebook as well as determining what was missing
Background check - of passing patrol and/or check point personnel who first arrived on the scene
Ultra Services communications - from the ultra-services.com web server including emails and records, also who had superuser access to server
Mechanics - interviews with area mechanics, especially at FOB Pacesetter and Camp Anaconda, to see if anyone remembers von Ackermann was seeking to get his tire fixed
Additional Reading
Army Regulation 195–5 (PDF)
Criminal Investigation
Evidence Procedures
Department of the Army
Washington, DC
June 25, 2007
Wednesday, February 24, 2010
Route Clemson
Learn something new every day.
main supply route - The route or routes designated within an operational area upon which the bulk of traffic flows in support of military operations. (page 323 JP 1-02)
Task Force Danger Press Release - reference on page 12
Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division, Tikrit, Iraq (FOB Danger)
November 21, 2004
Road Warriors: 50th MSB has logged plenty of miles in north-central Iraq
By Charlie Coon, Stars and Stripes, March 7, 2005
Troops receive explosive welcome south of Kirkuk
By Ben Murray, Stars and Stripes, October 6, 2006
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