Capt Stephen Santez USN

Captain Stephen F. Santez Jr., USN presenting Captain Kirk von Ackermann, USAF a Joint Service Commendation Medal from the JFIC on April 26, 2000

Within the last year, the name of a highly classified intelligence program of which Kirk von Ackermann was once a member was revealed with the release of documents under an FOIA request by a former intelligence officer known only as IRONMAN.

DO5 or the Asymmetric Threat Branch of the Joint Forces Intelligence Command (JFIC) was actively tracking Al Qaida until late 2000-early 2001 when it was inexplicably shut down by commanding officers. Kirk von Ackermann is said to have carried the weight of the prescience of his predictions - his hands tied by more senior officers - for the years to come.

That's not to say his work went unrecognized. As a result of his service with DO5, Kirk von Ackermann received at least one commendation, formally presented by Captain Stephen F. Santez Jr., USN. What event or service to the nation prompted the commendation is unknown. Kirk von Ackermann's wife Megan once wrote:

I heard things about 'briefings' and gradually recognized that the briefings were often to quite senior officers. I know there were commendations and awards, but details were obscured.

With the ever increasing role of social networking in and around our modern lives, it should come as no surprise that there is a LinkedIn page for Steve Santez, the same CAPT Santez pictured above. Included on Santez LinkedIn page is a short description of his work experience as the Director of Operations at the Joint Forces Intelligence Command from 1999-2002. It's worth noting that Director of Operations = J3.

Screen capture of LinkedIn page for Steve Santez

Steve Santez
Senior Intelligence Training Development Integrator at BAE Systems
Norfolk, Virginia Area
Defense and Space
http://www.linkedin.com/pub/steve-santez/47/a25/6a9

"…Expert in all-source intelligence with specific emphasis on asymmetric threat analysis, human intelligence, intelligence training development and delivery, and concept development and experimentation leading to results…"

Director of Operations
Joint Forces Intelligence Center
August 1999 – February 2002 (2 years 7 months) Norfolk, Virginia

Drove all intelligence analysis, production and training for the US Joint Forces Command Joint Forces Intelligence Center. Led over 100 military and civilian personnel across all mission areas of analysis, targeting, collections, watch center fusion, and asymmetric threat analysis. Led initial analysis during the Russian submarine KURSK sinking. Director of Operations during disestablishment of the US Atlantic Command and establishment of the US Joint Forces Command. Created the first asymmetric threat division at JFIC in support of Joint Task Force Civil Support and led analysis of Al Qaeda pre 9/11. Agent for change; worked with the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) to migrate Joint Personnel Recovery Intelligence Production to the Joint Forces Intelligence Center.

The language in Steve Santez bio more or less mirrors the same language found in the IRONMAN FOIA, Formal Complaint to DoD Inspector General re: JFIC and Congressional Inquiry which accompanies an article at TruthOut by Jeffrey Kaye.

(U) Contrary to JFIC's formal report to the JCS staff, JFIC had a direct and assigned purview on international terrorism against the U.S., to include the operations of al-Qa'ida and the 9/11 attackers. JFIC was directly responsible to both Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) and its subordinate, Joint Task Force-Civil Support (JTF-CS) for all-source intelligence anaiysis of international terrorism against the U.S. To ensure the quality of such analysis, JFlC's commanding officer [redacted] established the Asymmetric Threat Branch (DO5), charged with reporting on asymmetric threats, especially terrorism. [redacted] was subsequently promoted to JFCOM J2. As a RADM and PACOM J2, she established another Asymmetric Threat branch at PACOM.)

(U) The Asymmetric Threat Branch in JFIC was a forerunner of current all-source fusion centers. Unlike other analytical offices in the intelligence community, DO5 members had a wide mix of skilis in all six intelligence disciplines - HUMINT, OSINT, COMINT, ELINT, IMINT, and MASINT. Consequently, DO5 was abie to develop and use all-source, original analysis in a manner probably then unprecedented within the intelligence community. DO5 began preparing a wide range of original analysis on asymmetric warfare, especially terrorism, from mid-1998 until mid-2001.

For those unfamiliar with the significance of IRONMAN's Formal Complaint, this section should clarify matters:

(U) Reports on the most likely targets for domestic and international terrorists, both within the U.S. and abroad, as well as adjunct targets during a traditional war. The most sensitive of these reports were those identifying targets within the U.S., developing scenarios, analysis of commonalities for use in planning responses and recommendations for preventative action. This U.S. tasking was given by JTF-CS.

(S/NF) The reports were first prepared in the summer of 2000, in support of JTF-CS, and were briefed to the JFCOM J2, JTF-CS J2, and senior JFCOM staff, including the DCINC and J3. The JTF-CS Commander may have also attended the briefings. The first version of the briefing was entitled "The WMD Threat to the U.S.", (information cut off date 16 July 2000). The briefing slides emphasized that New York City was the most difficult consequence management problem, and recommended using NYC as the model for planning /exercises. The oral briefing itself was much more sensitive, indicating that the World Trade Centers # 1 and # 2 were the most likely buildings to be attacked in the U.S., followed closely by the Pentagon. The briefer indicated that the worst case scenario would be one tower collapsed onto the other. The possibility of striking the buildings with a plane may have been discussed then - it was certainly discussed in the red cell analysis leading up to the briefing. The acting Deputy of DO5, [redacted] proposed in the red cell analysis that the building could be struck by a jetliner. Discussion followed on contacting World Trade Center security and engineering/architectural staff, but the idea was not further explored because of a command climate discouraging contact with the civilian community. However, at the end of the briefing, the JFCOM J3 directed that the national military terrorism exercise for FY 02 be based on a New York worse-case scenario. He indicated he would've preferred to have done so in FY 01, but the military was already financially committed to another use (a cruise ship) in FY01.

Please keep in mind that all of this work was happening well before September 11, 2001.

The lives that could have and should have been protected...

(U) [...] In addition, I and the deputy of that team, [redacted] especially carried the burden of knowledge of how close DoD came to bin Ladin and perhaps being able to reduce the number of lives lost on 9/11. I do not want that burden any longer. [redacted] and I discussed this issue the last time we spoke. He remains the longest missing man in Iraq in this war, and I want, one day, to be able to explain to his children what their father foresaw.

The longest missing man in Iraq is Kirk von Ackermann.

Related Reading

DO5 in the News
September 9, 2011

Rear Admiral Rosanne LeVitre, USN
July 21, 2011

Counter Terrorism and JFIC
May 6, 2011

Counter Terrorism and Kirk von Ackermann
October 8, 2006

Joint Service Commendation Medal
January 23, 2006

References

Report: Intelligence Unit Told Before 9/11 to Stop Tracking Bin Laden

By Jeffrey Kaye, Truthout, May 23, 2011

Allegation of Misleading Congress PDF
To: Hon. Claude M. Kicklighter
DoD Inspector General
From: Edward Maguire
Director of National Intelligence
November 27, 2007

Attachment - Unclassified FOIA Response PDF
April 8, 2011
Formal Complaint to DoD Inspector General
re: JFIC and Congressional Inquiry
May 8, 2006

Review of Joint Forces Intelligence Command Response to 9/11 Commission PDF
Deputy Inspector General for Intelligence
United States Department of Defense
September 23, 2008
Declassified March 5, 2010
From the Federation of American Scientists

Abbreviations - used above

COMINT - Communications Intelligence
DO5 - Asymmetric Threat Division
DOD - Department of Defense
ELINT - Electronic Intelligence
FBI - Federal Bureau of Investigation
HUMINT- Intelligence
IMINT- Imagery Intelligence
J2 - Director for Intelligence
J3 - Director of Operations
JCS - Joint Chiefs of Staff
JFCOM - Joint Forces Command
JFIC - Joint Forces Intelligence Command
JIC - Joint Intelligence Center
JTF-CS - Joint Task Force- Civil Support
MASINT- Measurement and Signature Intelligence
OSINT- Open Source Intelligence
PACOM - Pacific Command
RADM - Rear Admiral
US - United States of America
USAF - United States Air Force
USN - United States Navy